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ABSTRACT 
 
CONSTRUCTION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN 
TURKEY 
 
Halistoprak, Burak Toygar 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Thesis Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Nil S. ġatana 
September 2011 
 
Maintaining civilian control over military constitutes the classical 
problematique of the civil-military relations (CMR) scholarship. Besides, the 
relationship between military and civilians are taken as conflictual. Constructivist 
approach, on the other hand, argues that roles of social actors are not constant but 
they are socially constructed through an interaction process. Building on the 
constructivist approach, this thesis aims to focus on the relationship between military 
and civilians as an outcome of a process. Its argument is that the nature of 
relationship between civilians and soldiers are socially constructed within the social 
interaction process. Thus, it uses constructivism as its theoretical framework to 
provide insights to the factors determinant on the role of military in the political 
system. It uses a “theory-building case study” method and intends to make some 
theoretical implications derived from Turkish case. It analyzes the role construction 
of military in two domains: Organizational domain; societal domain. While 
organizational domain focuses on the legal status and self-perception of Turkish 
Armed Forces, societal domain is composed of political sphere and citizenry. The 
study shows that instruments such as ideology, compulsory military service system, 
education and media are used to build a strong military role. It makes a comparison 
of two periods. First period is between 1980 and 2001. The thesis argues that a strong 
and active military role can be observed in the first period. The second period is post-
2001 period. In the second era, it is observed that there is a structural and discursive 
change in the military‟s role in Turkish political system with the effect of the 
relations with European Union. The thesis makes a modest contribution to the civil-
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military relations literature by using a theoretical framework which has not been used 
very often in the literature.  
Key Words: Civil-military relations, social constructivism, role construction, 
Turkey, Turkish Armed Forces, European Union.  
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKİYE’DE SİVİL-ASKER İLİŞKİLERİNİN İNŞAASI 
 
Halistoprak, Burak Toygar 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası ĠliĢkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nil Seda ġatana 
Eylül 2011 
 
Ordunun siviller tarafından kontrolü sivil-asker iliĢkileri alanının klasik 
sorunsalını teĢkil etmektedir. Ayrıca, ordu ve siviller arasındaki iliĢki ihtilaflı olarak 
tanımlanmaktadır. Diğer yanda ise, inĢacı yaklaĢım, sosyal aktörlerin rollerinin sabit 
olmadığını ve bu rollerin bir etkileĢim süreci içerisinde inĢa edildiğini iddia eder. Bu 
tez, inĢacı yaklaĢımdan yararlanarak, ordu ve siviller arasındaki iliĢkilere bir sürecin 
ürünü olarak odaklanmaktadır. Tezin savı, siviller ve askerler arasındaki iliĢkilerin 
doğasının bir sosyal etkileĢim süreci içerisinde inĢa edildiğidir. Bu nedenle, bu tez, 
ordunun politik sistem içindeki rolü üzerinde etkili olan faktörleri anlamak amacı ile, 
inĢacı kuramı teorik çerçevesi olarak kullanmaktadır. Tez, “teori inĢa edici vaka 
analizi” yöntemini kullanmakta ve Türkiye örneğinden yola çıkarak bazı teorik 
öngörülerde bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Ordunun rolünün inĢası iki alanda analiz 
edilmektedir: Kurumsal alan, toplumsal alan. Kurumsal alan Türk Silahlı 
Kuvvetleri‟nin hukuki statüsü ve kendi algısı üzerine odaklanırken, toplumsal alan, 
politik çevre ve vatandaĢlardan oluĢmaktadır. Bu çalıĢma; ideoloji, zorunluk askerlik, 
eğitim ve medya gibi araçların güçlü bir ordu rolü inĢa etme sürecinde kullanıldığını 
göstermektedir. Tez iki dönemin karĢılaĢtırmasını yapmaktadır. Ġlk dönem 1980-
2001 arasındaki dönemdir. Bu dönemde güçlü ve aktif bir ordu rolü 
gözlemlenebilmektedir. Ġkinci dönem 2001 sonrası dönemdir. Ġkinci dönemde, 
Avrupa Birliği ile olan iliĢkilerin etkisiyle, ordunun rolünde yapısal ve söylemsel bir 
değiĢiklik gözlemlenmektedir. Bu tez, sivil-asker iliĢkileri literatürüne, pek sık 
kullanılmamıĢ bir teorik çerçeveyi kullanarak, mütevazi bir katkı yapmaktadır.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1. Research Question 
 
Turkey entered into 2007 with hot debates on upcoming presidential elections. As the 
presidential elections approached, discussion focused on the question of who will be 
nominated by the government for presidential candidacy. The main opposition party, 
Republican People‟s Party (RPP) was stating that it would be damaging for 
democracy if all three top administrative positions, namely the Presidency, Prime 
Ministry and the Speaker of the Parliament, are assumed by the same political 
movement, which come from a political Islamist origin. Thus, RPP was inviting the 
government to nominate a candidate who can be internalized and accepted by all 
societal segments of the country. However, Justice and Development Party (JDP) 
preferred to nominate Abdullah Gül for presidential candidacy, who is known with 
his active carrier in banned political Islamist parties, Welfare Party (WP) and Virtue 
Party (VP) and whose ideological attitude has been strong. Following this 
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development, a usual problem of Turkish politics recurred. On the midnight of April 
27, the Office of the Chief of the General Staff published a press release on its 
official web page. In the declaration, it was stated that the candidate for presidency 
should be a person who internalized the principles of secular republic. Furthermore, 
it was explicitly put that Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) “will display its attitude and 
action openly and clearly whenever it is necessary (Sarigil 2009: 711).” Once again, 
the military was intervening a civilian process or threatening the civilians with a 
possible intervention. Although it was not a direct intervention in the form of a coup, 
TAF was reminding to all civilian segments that guarding the regime is attributed to 
TAF as a duty by laws in the last paragraph of the declaration. 
 Looking at the last fifty years of the Republican era, it can be asserted that 
military‟s direct/indirect interventions to political processes are not surprising for 
Turkish political system. The democratic process has been suspended with two coups 
and two memorandums from 1960 to early 2000‟s. However, following the 
declaration, civilian government acted in a certain manner, which was unusual for 
Turkish politics. Just a day after that declaration was published, on April 28, 
government‟s spokesman Cemil Çicek stated that the press release of the TAF is 
perceived as targeting the civilian government (NTVMSNBC News Portal).
1
 Çicek 
strongly stressed that “it is unacceptable in a democratic state of law that the Office 
of the Chief of the General Staff acts against the government, as an institution 
depended to Prime Ministry.” The spokesman stated that this is an intervention to a 
civilian process and this situation has the potential to cause instability within the 
country. Considering the past experiences, it can be asserted that the attitude of the 
government to TAF‟s press release was not a usual example. In the past, the civilian 
                                                          
1
 http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/406662.asp (Last Access 21.08.2011) 
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governments remained silence or passive once the military initiates such an 
intervention to the politics. The processes following such interventions resulted in 
the consequences, which military wanted to be realized (Brown 1989: 391).  
Although Supreme Court ruled that the presidential elections in the parliament, 
which was held on April 27 with the participation of 358 parliamentarians, were 
invalid due to the participation below 367, the process ended with the election of 
Abdullah Gül as the eleventh president of Turkey. In other words, the military‟s 
attempt to intervene to the process did not succeed to prevent the consequence that 
civilian government intended to get.  
 Since this process gave birth to a different consequence from past 
experiences, it prompted discussions about whether the military‟s position in Turkish 
politics is changing. Much of the students of Turkish civil-military relations agreed 
on that the role of the military in Turkish politics has been in a changing path 
(Demirel 2005; Satana 2008, Aydınlı 2009). According to Aydınlı (2009), there was 
a paradigmatic shift in the nature of the civil-military relations in Turkey and he 
asserted that the coup era in Turkey is closed. This altering nature of the civil-
military relations in Turkey shall naturally require all actors to adapt their new role. 
The military should redefine its role, internalize and exercise it differently from it did 
in the past. Besides, civilians should also reconsider the position of the military in 
Turkish politics.  
This thesis intends to analyze the construction of the social roles of actors in 
civil-military relations by focusing on the Turkish case. At this point, I should note 
that the main focus of the thesis is not to analyze the April 27 incident specifically; 
rather it intends to scrutinize the question of how military‟s role is constructed and 
how this role construction affects the civil-military relations. It uses the Turkish case 
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to examine the construction of military‟s role in general. If we talk about a change in 
the role of TAF, why such a change happened? How differently was constructed the 
role of military from its previous roles? I will return the case selection and research 
question below.  
Maintaining civilian control over the military constitutes the classical 
problematique of the civil-military relations (CMR) scholarship. The debates in the 
literature focus on the question of how to accommodate democratic oversight of the 
military by civilian authorities. According to Huntington (1957), military should be 
professionalized to curb its interference in politics. The professionalization of the 
military would bring a military model that is isolated from politics. Thus, he 
proposes the framework of “objective civilian control” to keep military outside of 
politics, while it has a relative autonomy in its domestic affairs. Janowitz (1960) 
claims that keeping military isolated from the society in the name of 
professionalization would not necessarily contribute to the aim of keeping military 
outside of politics. On the contrary, he proposed further convergence between 
military and civilians to fill the gap between the two worlds. According to 
Janowitz, the more military and civilians interact; the easier it is to maintain civilian 
control over the military. Feaver (1996: 153) argues that civilians should remain 
political masters. Thus, he proposes a principal-agent relationship, in which 
civilians are the decision-makers as principals, while military is the implementer as 
the agent.  
This brief introduction to the CMR literature shows that scholars have 
different answers for the question of how to control military. Many other theoretical 
frameworks proposed by CMR scholars are discussed in the Literature Review 
Chapter. Although scholars propose different models of civilian controls and debate 
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about its scope, there is a general agreement in the literature about military should 
be controlled by civilian authority and it should not interfere in politics (Feaver 
1992; Burk 2002; Desch 2008; Schiff 2009).  This is an expression of a concern 
based on the assumption that if military is not controlled; it could try to influence 
politics. This concern has a historical legacy indeed. Modern military emerged as a 
political institution. With the emergence of nation-states, armies of empires in 
Europe were transformed to citizen armies in which citizens were conscripted. This 
structural change in the military model resulted in politicization of the armed 
forces. With this change, some militaries of Europe were not only guardians of 
territories but they also take their part in nation-building processes in different parts 
of Europe. For example, sociologist Eugen Weber (1976) focuses on how ordinary 
French peasants turned into modern French citizens. According to him, French 
Army, which transformed to a citizen-army after the Revolution, was the place 
where national awareness is indoctrinated to people in rural France. Similarly, 
German Army was an important actor in the politics of Germany‟s post-unification 
period. According to Showalter (1983: 605), German Army played an important 
role in politics and modernization process of Germany in late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
century, until Hitler isolated the Army from the public and redesigned it within the 
Nazi regime. Hence, although it is not generalizable for all European countries, 
some European armies did not remain as the protector of the borders, but they 
transformed into institutions which affect and sometimes influence politics of 
countries. Thus, it is reasonable that CMR scholars have doubts on military‟s 
possible engagement in politics. However, this doubt limited the literature to the 
narrow question of “how to maintain” or “how to reinforce” civilian control over 
the military.  
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Turkish Army also followed this active military model, which takes 
initiative in the politics of the country (Brown 1989; Narlı 2000). Nevertheless, not 
all armies, which took part in nation-building processes, remained politically active. 
Many armies in Europe stepped back from political sphere and left this domain to 
the civilians. This is why the dynamics that are effective on the military‟s role 
differed from case to case. The role of military in each case has been constructed 
differently. Thus, presence of military‟s active role in the formation of the political 
system of the country should be taken as one input in the role construction process 
of military. Military‟s role is shaped in each case by passing through different 
processes, which led different military models.    
This thesis intends to examine this role construction process rather than the 
narrow focus on the civilian control of the general CMR literature. At this point, I 
would like to briefly mention why role construction process is important in the 
analysis of civil-military relations, though it is elaborated in detail in 2.2. 
According to constructivist assumption, role and interests of the actors are not fixed 
and inherited to those actors. Rather, the roles of actors are directly related with 
their identity, which is the outcome of a construction process. In the same vein, 
military‟s role in a particular political system is also constructed within a process. 
Thus, any military role –interventionist/non-interventionist; political/non-political- 
is not naturally embedded in the existence of the military, but this role emerges 
depending on its identity that is an outcome of a social process. At this point, I 
conceptualize the role construction process as the social interaction process in 
which different actors offer inputs in the identities of one another.  
In this context, the research question of this thesis is “what factors affect 
construction of military‟s role in different domains?” Furthermore, it is important to 
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investigate how those factors shape military‟s role in the construction process. 
Construction process is analyzed in two domains. First is the organizational 
domain, in which military‟s self-perception of its role emerges. Historical legacy of 
a strong military model can be effective at institutional domain and shape the self-
perception of the institution. Second domain of the role construction process is the 
societal domain, which is further divided into two societal segments. Military‟s role 
is constructed in its discourse and as a legal status within the political sphere.  
The other societal segment in which military‟s role is constructed is 
citizenry‟s perception. My research on this construction process shows that 
different instruments are used in these three domains to construct Turkish Armed 
Forces‟ role. Firstly, the political mechanisms offered significant tools to the 
military to exercise a wide range a political power. Military rule of the country 
from 1980 to 1983 prepared the legal infrastructure of the military‟s engagement 
with politics. 1982 Constitution, the Internal Service Code and several other legal 
documents provided military a strong position over the Turkish politics. The 
Constitution granted National Security Council, which was a military dominant 
organ from 1980 to 2001, broad authority.  
Secondly, the economic activities of the military were another important 
tool for military to reinforce its position. Besides, the historical narration of the 
military, which centers itself within the liberation of the state and the nation, 
strengthened the strong self-perception of the military.  
Thirdly, presence of the militarist discourse in civilian education and 
absolute autonomy of the military in its internal indoctrination offered effective 
tools to military to express itself within civilian sphere comfortably.  
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Finally, the press and media were other instruments, which facilitated to 
construct a strong military position in the perception of the society. In addition to 
these material instruments, conceptualization of the security threats provided a 
discursive advantage to the military to legitimize its strong presence within the 
politics. At this point, the question is “who has used these instruments?” Since the 
constructivist approach takes the process as an interactive concept, it can be 
asserted that these instruments are not used by specific actors; rather they have been 
inputs of the process, which have not shaped only the role of military but 
perceptions of other actors.   
This research question contributes to the literature by dealing with the 
process instead of the outcome of the process. It takes civil-military relations as a 
process which can result in different military role models in different political 
constructions. I contend that a social constructivist approach is useful to understand 
the process in which military‟s role is socially and gradually constructed. In this 
regard, this thesis makes a contribution to the CMR literature by using social 
constructivism as its theoretical framework, which has been under-utilized in the 
CMR literature. Anthony Forster underlines that (2002: 5) “… recently 
constructivist approaches have offered analytical tools for understanding how the 
concepts of „civilian control‟, „professionalization‟, „modernization‟ and „security 
sector reform‟, have been used as means to transfer particular western values, ideas 
and institutions…” However, he also notes the limitedness of these works. Ender et 
al. (2009) focus on how U.S. cadets construct their own conceptualization of 
“social problems”. Campbell‟s doctoral dissertation that was completed in 2008 
claims that a social constructivist theoretical model can be utilized to understand 
effect of countries‟ bilateral relations on civil-military relations. Despite the 
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presence of these studies, however, Lambert states that (2011: 164) “it is too early 
to assert that there has been a „constructivist turn‟ in civil-military relations…” 
Thus, this thesis will make a modest contribution to constructivist approaches to 
CMR, while it applies it to the Turkish framework.  
Another novelty of this thesis is about the approach it uses. In the CMR 
literature, western models of civil-military settings are highlighted as the goal. 
Thus, western civil-military settings constituted the core of theoretical framework 
used by the CMR scholars. In many case studies in the literature, the theoretical 
frameworks derived from western models are tested against those cases. Bland 
emphasizes that theoretical approaches in CMR literature are “weak or even 
entirely lacking (1999: 7)” because studies are too bound to cases. Similarly, 
Rebecca Schiff (1995: 8) states that current theory in CMR “assumes that American 
institutional separation should be applied to all nations to prevent domestic military 
intervention.” The assumption that western model of CMR is the ideal one neglects 
several dimensions. First, since the construction process differs from case to case, 
theoretical frameworks that are used in these studies remain limited to explain the 
political situation in different cases. Secondly, the status of military is not only a 
matter of politics but it is also ritualized as a practice of culture. Hence, this thesis 
uses a “theory-building case study” to show how social constructivism applies to 
understanding civil-military relations, by deriving a specific approach from Turkish 
case. Therefore, theoretical implications that this thesis derives from the Turkish 
case are not to generalize but to form theoretical propositions to explain similarly 
constructed cases.  
 10 
 
 
1.2. Methodology: Theory-Building Case Studies 
 
Case study is a research strategy which focuses on a specific setting and intends to 
analyze it within the proposed theoretical framework. According to Yin, case study 
intends to analyze limited number of social events with qualitative analysis (Yin 
1994). Similarly, Gerring defines case study as a method, which studies intensively 
on a single unit, to make generalizations on larger proportion of similar units 
(Gerring 2004: 342). Thus, it can be asserted that case studies are not only used to 
specialize on a specific social event, rather they are used in the literature to make 
generalizations for relevantly constituted cases. 
Case studies are conducted for different goals. Some case studies are 
conducted to make descriptive analyses. These kinds of case studies focus on a unit 
and examine it intensively within its historical flux. These case studies do not aim 
to make a generalization on similar social events; rather they focus on how to 
categorize the case in question. Testing a theory can be another motivation to 
conduct a case study. Case studies can be used to apply a certain theory in the 
literature to the case, and explore whether the theory is reciprocal for various cases. 
If the findings of the case support the predictions of the applied theory, it can be 
classified as a “theory-confirming case study.” Findings derived from the case may 
not always support theory. This kind of study is called as “theory-infirming case 
studies” (George and Benett 2005). Finally, case studies can be conducted to 
engender theories.  
In this thesis, I aim to focus on the Turkish case to generate new theoretical 
propositions on civil-military relations. Theory-building case study method requires 
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an inductive research perspective (Eisenhardt 1989). In this method, the findings of 
the case study help to build a theoretical framework. Thus, this theoretical 
framework tends to be more specific and capable of explaining similarly developed 
cases, rather than being a general theory which claims to be explanatory for each 
case in the same field. Another aspect of theory-building case study is that its aim is 
to extend the existing theory to an understudied dimension or generate a new 
theoretical approach which has not been used before (Eisenhardt and Graebner 
2007: 28). According to Eisenhardt (1989: 536), since the theory-building case 
study aims to generate a theoretical framework, it should be conducted as close as 
possible to the ideal of no hypotheses to test against the case. Rather, its 
preliminary aim should be to lead to hypotheses that can be applicable to similar 
cases. Theory-building case study method is claimed to be less precise and rigorous 
compared to a large scale hypothesis testing (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007: 26). 
Thus, it is important to explain why a theory-building case study is needed instead 
of a theory-testing approach. According to Eisenhardt and Graebner, a key response 
to this challenge is to define the research question in detail and explain why 
existing literature remains incomplete to answer this question (2007: 26).  
 
1.3. Case Selection: Why Turkish CMR? 
 
According to Flyvbjerg, it is a misunderstanding about case studies to claim that 
case studies are useful only for hypothesis testing but not suitable to build theories 
(Flyvbjerg 2006: 221). Rather, “it depends on the case one is speaking of and how 
it is chosen (2006: 225).” Hence, in this section, I aim to explain why I have picked 
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a theory-building case study approach by focusing on case of Turkey as the method 
of this thesis.  
In this thesis, I focus on the case of Turkey to build a theoretical framework 
and generate hypotheses to understand how the military‟s position in the political 
system is constructed. At this point, I want to explain why I focus on Turkey to 
build a theoretical framework. The case of Turkey is appropriate for such an 
inductive research because of several reasons. Firstly, Turkey has been a case 
which is easy to observe its military‟s strong role in its political system. Military‟s 
political power has appeared in the form of military coups and memorandums. 
Even, in the times of civilian governments‟ rule of country, military‟s involvement 
in politics was noticeable. Such a case, in which military‟s strong role is obvious, is 
easier to develop a theoretical framework explaining construction of a strong 
military role compared to a case in which practices of civilian control are 
consolidated; because, in a case like Turkey, it is easier to detect indicators of 
strong position of military in different domains. Thus, Turkish case presents an 
opportunity to engender a theoretical framework to explain similar cases which 
have strong military influence in politics. Secondly, social construction of Turkish 
military‟s role has been challenged by re-definition of its role, which I examine 
under the titles of “deconstruction” and “reconstruction”; hence, Turkish case is 
appropriate to build a theoretical framework to see how different processes can 
interactively shape military‟s role in politics. 
I analyze two different time periods of Turkish civil-military relations. The 
first period that I analyze is from 1980 to 2001. I took 1980 as the beginning of my 
temporal analysis, because, I intend to examine the direct effects of military coup of 
1980 on the construction of military‟s role at different domains. 2001 is the 
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beginning of the second period that I analyze, because I aim to see the effect of 
international relations on military‟s role. In 1999, Turkey was acknowledged as an 
official candidate to European Union (EU). This development carried Turkey‟s 
relationships with EU into a more serious dimension compared to fragile 
relationship in late 1980‟s and early 1990‟s. With the initiation of harmonization 
packages in 2001, the political setting in Turkey significantly reformed. EU has 
been a pushing force for Turkey to reform its structure of civil-military relations in 
accordance with the EU criteria. Thus, I believe that comparison of these two 
periods provide the opportunity to examination of different construction processes. 
 
1.4. Organization of the Chapters 
 
This thesis is composed of three other chapters apart from this introductory chapter. 
The following chapter reviews different literatures to link them to one another. In 
the first section of the literature review chapter, I examine the general arguments of 
civil-military relations theory. This review of the literature shows that the problem 
of military‟s civilian control constitutes the core of CMR studies. The second 
section of the chapter focuses on social constructivism and its use in comparative 
politics. Next, this theoretical framework is applied it to the civil-military relations 
context. The focus is on the identity construction process to see constructivism‟s 
approach to construction of social actors‟ roles. Finally, a brief review of Turkish 
civil-military relations literature follows. In this section, I observe that scholars of 
Turkish CMR agree on the historical position of the army providing the military a 
justification of its strong presence within politics. Besides, studies generally 
recognize that the pattern of the Turkish civil-military relations has been in an 
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altering path since early 2000‟s. This chapter is finalized with the discussion of the 
gaps within CMR literature and opportunities to utilize a constructivist approach to 
analyze military‟s role specifically in Turkish case.  
Chapter 3 constitutes the main body of the empirical research to apply the 
constructivist perspective to Turkish civil-military relations. This chapter tackles 
the military‟s role construction at different domains. I compare two different 
periods in Turkish politics. First period of analysis is 1980-2001 and the second 
period is post-2001. In this section, I analyze the military‟s role in two domains: 
Organizational and societal. I briefly present findings from archival research on 
mainstream media published in early post-1980 coup era.
2
  
Chapter 4, which is the concluding chapter, summarizes the research:  
makes concluding remarks and underlines the implications of the theoretical 
propositions for further research.    
                                                          
2
 The self-perception of the military leaders should idealy be resaearched and analyzed by 
interviewing these leaders. However, this thesis depends on archival data and intense to use interview 
data in future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
The following review of three different bodies of literature, civil-military relations 
(CMR), social constructivism and Turkish CMR, shows that studies using social 
constructivist approach to civil-military relations are limited in the literature.  
The chapter is organized into four sections. In the first section, the CMR 
literature in general is reviewed and analyzed. In this section, it is identified that 
CMR literature has mostly focused on the problem of how to keep military under 
civilian control. In the second section, constructivist approaches to comparative 
politics are reviewed. Concepts such as identity, social construction of the actors are 
elaborated. Third section focuses on the Turkish civil-military relations in a historical 
chronological order. Final section seeks to identify the gaps in CMR literature and 
briefly lists the opportunities provided by the constructivist approach to fill these 
gaps. It also explains why this thesis argues that a new theoretical approach is needed 
in the studies of civil-military relations. 
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2.1. Civil-Military Relations Theory 
 
In the early literature, the tendency was to emphasize the separation between military 
and civilian worlds (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960). Thus, theories of early 
scholars focused on the CMR as the study of problems between military and civilians 
derived from the difference of paradigms in these two worlds. According to 
Huntington (1957), military world is conservative and aggressive in its nature; hence, 
it is not possible to analyze the military‟s attitude with the paradigms of the civilian 
world.  
In contrast, Rebecca Schiff (1995) criticized the absolute distinction between 
military and civilian worlds (1995: 10). According to her, it is inevitable that military 
and civilians penetrate into each other‟s spheres; thus, the distinction is more or less 
bound to the American case of CMR (1995: 10). Feaver‟s theory is a turning to 
absolute distinction between two worlds. According to him, civilians and military 
should be considered as separate; otherwise the theory would not be about civil-
military relations (Feaver 1996: 168). Feaver defines the civil-military problematique 
as the “tension caused by the increasing or decreasing scope of delegation and 
monitoring the military‟s behavior (1996: 168)”.  
The idea that military should not interfere in political sphere in such manner 
that can harm the democratic process is generally agreed among CMR scholars 
(Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Lyons 1961; Feaver 1992; Schiff 1995; Feaver 
1996; Bland 1999; Moskos, Williams et al. 2000). Rather, the debate is about how to 
build a civil-military model in which military do not go beyond the borders of its 
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own sphere and penetrate into politics. Civilian control of the military is proposed to 
keep military outside of political sphere.   
Analyses on civilian control of military take Huntington as the beginning 
point of modern CMR theory of civilian control. Early debates in the literature were 
built on three concepts: Professionalization, civilian control of the military and effect 
of external threat to military‟s position in politics. Huntington‟s model of civil-
military setting is based on separate military and civilian worlds. Thinking and acting 
patterns of two worlds significantly differ from each other both in practical and 
theoretical levels. Separation of two worlds is important in terms of further theory 
building. He proposes that militaries, which have been professionalized, are less 
likely to have political power (1957). Although he does not propose a politically 
autonomous model of military, he states that military should have autonomy on its 
inner practices to provide military security, which is another aspect that Huntington 
takes into account. Thus, the concept of professionalism seems to be a key concept 
for Huntington‟s model of civilian control of military. The “objective civilian 
control,” which he claimed to be the best way of maximizing military security within 
a military system controlled by civilian politicians, could only be provided by 
professionalizing the military (Huntington 1957: 83). In this model, the military is 
controlled by civilians in decision making level. Issues related to daily politics in the 
monopoly of civilians, yet, they consult military if necessary. However, the internal 
autonomy of the military, Huntington suggests, should not be intervened by civilians. 
When the model turns into a system in which internal autonomy of military is 
intervened by civilians, Huntington names it “subjective civilian control” (1957: 80). 
In such a model, military can be subject to civilian rule; however, military security 
might be highly damaged by the civilians who have totally different conditions of 
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existence compared to military world. At this point, Huntington‟s attitude towards 
civilian control of military is limited since he attributes a damaging potential to 
civilian control. Although they do not take the problem in a constructivist 
framework, rationalist scholars also intend to question the roots of military‟s political 
power. Huntington proposes that ideological model of the society affects the 
military‟s role in the politics. Anti-military and pro-military ideological systems are 
two categories suggested by Huntington (1957: 96). According to him, ideological 
patterns of society shape military‟s role in politics. However, Huntington‟s theory 
lacks the explanation of how these ideological models emerge. If ideological models 
vary from case to case, theory should also focus on the factors contributing the 
differentiation of these ideological patterns. The absence of the focus on this 
dimension constitutes one of the gaps in Huntington‟s theory building.  
In Huntington‟s model that is based on separate military and civilian worlds, 
if military penetrates into political area, which is supposed to remain civilian, this 
intervention requires a justification. Considering that military mind has a more 
pessimistic characteristic than civilian mind (Huntington 1957: 60), it is possible to 
predict that military‟s attitude towards issues of civilian politics would be more 
conservative compared to civilians. Thus a role construction process, which this 
thesis intends to analyze, is needed to legitimize the military‟s intervention and 
justify its conservative approach. According to Huntington, the role of military 
becomes praetorian and politicized if the society lacks effective political institutions 
to mediate, refine and moderate political action of civilian actors (1968: 195-196). 
As a result of the absence of effective political institutions, the political power is 
fragmented among different actors (1968: 196). Although Huntington does not 
further elaborate how military‟s role becomes dominant in this fragmented power 
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structure, this can be taken as a beginning point for the necessity of an analysis on 
military‟s role construction in a broader context.  
Like Huntington, Janowitz also focuses on the concept of professionalism. It 
is possible to assert that Janowitz is in an agreement with Huntington about separate 
civilian and military worlds exist. He defines the professional soldier as naturally 
conservative unlike the civilian individuals (1960: 23). Hence, a natural tension 
between military and civilian elites finds its place in Janowitz‟s theory as similar to 
Huntington‟s model. However, his separation of military and civilian worlds is based 
on a co-existence. He suggests that maintaining civilian control on professional army 
can be achieved with a rapprochement between military and civilians. This 
rapprochement can prevent an unwanted political activation of military. Unlike 
Huntington, Janowitz asserts that when more civilians are included in different 
processes of military‟s internal practices, such as military indoctrination, and 
assignment of military officers,  it is possible to fill the gap between two separate 
worlds. According to him the gap between two worlds is the reason of classical civil-
military tension. In other words, Janowitz suggests a civilianization of military mind 
via convergence of military and civilians. However, it can be questioned that what 
guarantees that a militarization of civilian mind would not occur rather than a 
civilianization of military mind, which Janowitz predicts, via this convergence.  
Janowitz‟s theory gives the signs of military‟s role construction to some 
extent, by analyzing both internal and external political dimensions. According to 
him, conditions of Cold War era caused an installation of “constabulary force (1960: 
418)” duty to the American military. The threat perception, which is perceived by 
American military, was reflected to civilians as military should always be prepared to 
act against Soviet threat. He states that this transfer of perception from military to 
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civilians created an inevitable politicization of American military, which constitutes 
a challenge to civilian supremacy (1960: 435). Besides the societal dimension, 
Janowitz underlines the importance of institutional dimension. At institutional level, 
military seeks to reinforce the cohesion among military personnel and society, and 
intends to impose its own perception of its role to the society. Military education and 
military service system are two important tools for shaping military‟s role in a 
political system (Janowitz 1964). Since Janowitz came from a sociologist 
background, it‟s not surprising that he focused more on societal perception of 
military‟s role compared to Huntington, however, he is not going further in detail 
about how military shapes the civilian perception and is shaped by it.  
Abrahamsson (1972) also challenges the Huntingtonian professionalism. He 
states that military is a rational actor, which seeks its own institutional interests 
(1972: 150-154). Thus, military cannot be taken as a politically neutral actor in 
Abrahamsson‟s approach. Thus, he asserts that professionalization of military can 
curb its ties with politics in western democracies where institutions and control 
mechanisms are consolidated. However, in the cases in which military initiate coups 
against civilians, professionalism extends the duration of military regime.   
Finer approaches civil-military relations with a different understanding from 
his counterparts. In contrast to Huntington and Janowitz, Finer focuses on the 
question of why military intervene in politics but not how to maintain civilian control 
over it. According to him, the ideal setting of civil-military relations is the model in 
which military is democratically controlled by civilians (2002: 21). However, he also 
notes three basic factors render military more advantageous in front of the civilian 
politicians (2002: 6). Firstly, according to Finer, soldiers are organized in a superior 
structure compared to civilian actors. Thus, they can pursue a cohesive discourse 
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while civilian actors are more prone to differ from each other. Secondly, the military 
in most cases are based on an emotionalized status. Narratives about the heroic 
military figures provide soldiers a privileged place in the perception of society. 
Finally, military is the organization which holds the monopoly over legal violence 
and arms. Thus, it provides an absolute material superiority compared to other actors. 
In this regard, Finer questions why military do not intervene in politics while it has 
such an advantageous position. At this point, he agrees with Huntington and 
Janowitz about military and civilian worlds are completely different existences. 
Thus, the separation of military and political spheres emerges in its historical process 
as the necessity of this dramatic difference between military and civilian worlds. He 
differentiates from Huntington and Janowitz in his approach to professionalism. As 
touched upon above, Huntington suggested professionalism as the key of civilian 
control. However, Finer counters this argument and states that professionalized army 
can intervene in politics as well as unprofessional armies. He gives the German and 
Japanese armies as the examples of highly professional armies, which engaged with 
politics in the past (2002: 25-27). According to Heper (2011) in his forthcoming 
article “this is because military may start perceiving itself close to the state rather 
than to political government and, at the same time, military would be able to act 
more decisively.”   
As touched upon above, Huntington and several other early authors of CMR 
built their argument on the assumption that high risk of external threat increases the 
likelihood of a politically active military model. However, Desch puts a 
counterargument. Desch (1999) pays attention to the effect of threat environment on 
the military‟s role in domestic politics. He also accepts that ideal case in the civil-
military relations is the civilian control of military and civilians‟ prevalence in the 
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decision-making mechanisms. (1999: 5). Desch‟s main argument is that less 
challenging threat environments causes weakening of the civilian control over the 
military (1999: 3). With this aspect, Desch‟s argument challenges the assumption 
that presence of threats leads a politically active military model. He notes that “it is 
easiest for civilians to control the military when they face primarily international 
(external) threats and it is hardest for them to control the military when they face 
primarily internal threats (1999: 6).” He finds former literature weak because he 
asserts that existing literature‟s emphasis on individual or institutional aspect does 
not properly explain military‟s political power. Instead, his theory builds on the 
effect of external factors which have an influential role on military‟s role in the 
domestic politics. 
Welch (1992) scrutinizes the factors facilitates military‟s disengagement from 
politics. According to him, many scholars focus on the process in which military 
steps back from involvement in politics in different cases. However, they have not 
developed systematic and common patterns to explain this disengagement process. 
Rather, “studies present disengagement as random events (1992: 324).” Most 
important reason of this gap in the literature is that the CMR literature has been 
developing under the influence of western paradigm. He states that scholars‟ 
“common democratic heritage may unconsciously shaped the evidence they seek” in 
the cases that they focus on. This is another example of the criticisms that I touched 
upon in the introduction, stating that CMR literature has been bound to western 
models of civil-military settings.  
Welch categorizes disengagement process of military in two titles (1992: 325-
326). “Planned extrication” is the process in which military consciously steps back 
from the politics. Second model of the disengagement is “unplanned breakdown” of 
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the military regime. In this model, some factors trigger turmoil in the society, 
political structure of the country and this process leads breakdown of the military 
regime. Factors which facilitate the military‟s disengagement from politics are 
Welch‟s focus. He underlines several preconditions for military‟s disengagement 
from politics. First, he emphasizes the significance of intramilitary factors (1992: 
327). According to him, institutionalized militaries have more definite role 
descriptions compared to other militaries which have not consolidated their 
institutional framework. This can be taken as a claim of correlation between military 
professionalization and institutionalization. Attitude of “top brass” toward the 
disengagement is another determinant factor on the process. Reluctance of the high 
ranked officers has a potential to blockade the disengagement process. Thus, it can 
be asserted that Welch takes the organizational will of the military to disengage from 
politics into account.  
Social events are also important to analyze the disengagement process. Civil 
disputes and suffering economic conditions can increase the possibility of a military 
regime while social cohesion can promote disengagement process. According to him, 
most of the African coups are directly related with the deep ethnic fragmentation of 
these countries‟ populations (1967: 315; 1992: 331).  
Welch‟s emphasis on several important gaps in the literature is important in 
terms of further theory building. First, he believes greater scholarly effort in the field 
coming from third world can contribute the expansion of the literature‟s scope. It 
would contribute to aim of developing a general pattern for understanding military‟s 
disengagement from politics. Secondly, more knowledge is needed about 
intramilitary attitudes. At this point, I believe this thesis contributes to this gap by 
elaborating Turkish military‟s self-perception of its role in Chapter 4. Finally, he 
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touches upon that political culture should be included more in the CMR analysis. He 
asserts that “political culture affects perceptions of military, political parties and the 
legitimacy of the system as a whole (1992: 338).” Thus, I believe that this is another 
important gap in the literature addressed by Welch, and I focus on the strength of the 
militarist discourse in the political culture of Turkey to understand construction of 
TAF‟s role in the manner that Welch identified.   
Schiff agrees on that challenging external threat environments can cause more 
political armies. However, she criticizes the absolute distinction of the civilian and 
military spheres. Rebecca Schiff‟s Concordance Theory brought a strong emphasis 
on cultural and historical issues to the CMR theory. Schiff criticizes the former 
theory in terms of two points. Firstly, as discussed within CMR definitions, Schiff 
rejects an absolute distinction between military and civilian spheres (Schiff 1995). 
According to her, the distinction between two spheres is bound to American case, 
which has traditionally separate military and civilian spheres (1995: 10). This case is 
not always the same everywhere in world; thus, former theory -Schiff‟s critique is 
generally on Huntington‟s conceptualization- fails to cover general CMR framework. 
Secondly, former theory lacks the cultural and historical emphasis, which expectably 
varies from case to case. Institutional analysis, according to Schiff, takes the 
separation as a natural phenomenon as an ideal and optimum norm of CMR, 
however, even the American case is an outcome of cultural experience derived from 
historical context (1995: 11). Schiff suggests four points to be agreed on by the three 
societal segments. These segments are the military, political leadership and the 
citizenry (1995: 12). At this point it is important to note that Schiff, unlike former 
theories, does not take political elites as the fundamental civilian component to be 
analyzed. Rather, she criticizes this approach of former theories and makes a separate 
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analysis based on citizenry, which this thesis tends to adopt under a similar 
categorization: “Political sphere” and “Citizenry”. The four issues to be agreed on 
these three segments are composition of the officer corps, political decision-making 
process, recruitment method and military style. According to Schiff, if military, 
political elites and citizens agree on these four issues, there would be less likelihood 
of military to intervene politics. Schiff can be criticized of being shallow about how 
the agreement would be provided between actors. An agreement among different 
segments requires certain processes. These processes can be negotiation or coercion. 
It can be questioned that which dynamics have a role on these three actors came to a 
common point. What would be the reasons of a possible disagreement? Why does the 
scope of agreement vary from case to case? These are the questions worth exploring 
in a broader context, which this thesis intends to do. 
Scope of military‟s autonomy has been another important point discussed in 
the literature. David Pion-Berlin‟s categorization of military‟s autonomy is based on 
two models: offensive autonomy and defensive autonomy (Pion-Berlin 1992). In 
offensive model, autonomous military seeks to enhance the scope of its political 
power and strengthen its own decision-making powers (1992: 85). Pion-Berlin 
suggests that offensively autonomous militaries are expectably likely to have a great 
political power like in Latin American cases. On the other hand, militaries with 
defensive autonomy have an institutional basis seeking to protect its inner procedures 
from excessive political intervention. Undoubtedly, categorization of military 
typologies is helpful for understanding the differentiated roles of militaries. 
However, Pion-Berlin‟s categorization is based on an analysis only at the 
institutional level. Since he focuses on Latin American cases, it lacks analysis on 
different dimensions that have role on military‟s autonomy model. Typology of the 
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autonomy model is based on a monological process, in which military has an 
absolute influence on determination of its own autonomy model, rather than a 
dialogical one in which different actors interact during the construction of their role. 
Feaver is in an agreement with Huntington and Janowitz about distinctness of 
military and civilian spheres. Thus, his theory is critical about Schiff‟s argument 
stating that the idea of distinct military and civilian spheres is flawed. According to 
him, Schiff‟s critique is bound to Huntingtonian definition of distinctness, which he 
claims having normative bias in favor of keeping the spheres completely distinct 
(Feaver 1992: 168). Feaver‟s definition of CMR focuses on a specific framework. 
The theory, according to Feaver, is not about documenting all forms of contacts 
between military and civilians, rather it should specifically focus on a narrow 
framework, which is the tension derived from disputes on monitoring the military‟s 
behavior in various areas by civilians. With this aspect, Feaver‟s theory is limited to 
analyze the classical dilemma of CMR: how to control military? His proposal of a 
new theory is based on these assumptions. He argues that “principal-agent model 
(2003: 54-117)”, which is borrowed from management discipline (2003: 54), is 
applicable to CMR theory. In this model, the distinction between military and 
civilian spheres has an important place. The principal institution, which is the 
civilian part, establishes the agent institution, the military, to protect itself. In this 
relation, agent is subjected to direction of the principal institution, in other words, 
military, which is established by civilians, should be under civilian control (2003: 
57).  
At this point, Feaver‟s theory can be questioned as “what if principal and 
agent institutions would not be as in Feaver‟s prediction?” In his theory, it is as 
simple as the military is located in agent position which is established by civilians; 
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thus there is no doubt that civilians should be in principal position. However, military 
institutions, in many cases, can have a different role on foundation of political 
system, modernization of the society, even on economy, as happened in Northern 
African cases (Janowitz 1977). Hence, Feaver‟s theory can remain limited these 
cases which have different dynamics of political formations.   
Douglas Bland (1999) also underlines the narrow and limited scope of theory 
in the literature. According to him, different answers exist in the literature to the 
question of how to maintain civilian control over military. However, he asserts that 
these answers are unconnected and remain as “unidimensional descriptions that 
address only parts of the problem or even only particular problems in some states 
(1999: 8).” According to him, problems of civil-military relations occur in all 
societies to some degree despite the conditions that affect them change in different 
cases. Thus, theory‟s aim should be to create a common theoretical ground for these 
cases and relate them to one another within this theoretical framework. This “unified 
theory” should address all problems of CMR within one model and this model should 
be tested against different cases. At this point, he proposes a theoretical framework 
designed to civilian control of military in the basis of a shared responsibility. 
According to him, place of the military is not only an advisory mechanism for 
guidance to civilians in technical issues, but it also takes responsibility in the 
formation of a stable civilian control. In this context, military shares responsibility 
with civilians in four domains: strategic decisions, organizational decisions on 
arrangement of the sources, social issues such as society‟s approach to armed forces 
and finally practical operational decisions. It can be asserted that Bland‟s theory does 
not takes civilian control as a pure civilian process, rather, in this model, military 
also contribute to the process going to maintaining civilian control over itself. 
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Forster (2002) argues that we are passing through a period in which the focus 
of the CMR changes as the consequence of three reasons. Firstly, Forster states that 
the epistemology that the former CMR literature is built on has been challenged by 
broader epistemological approaches. In this regard, “it is important to highlight the 
plurality of the „New Civil-Military Relations‟ methods, rather than a single 
theoretical approach (Forster 2002: 71).” Secondly, authors of CMR are recently 
focusing on the issues that are previously overlooked in the literature. Finally, 
relations of the military to civilian world are getting wider compared to Cold War 
era. Thus, the scope of CMR is extending in the manner that including military‟s 
relations with several other civilian segments such as NGO‟s, international 
organizations, trade unions. This extension in the scope of the CMR raises new 
questions, which are neglected by the “Old” CMR. As a result of these reasons, 
Forster argues that a redefinition of the field is needed.  
In this regard, Forster states that reconceptualization of the social knowledge 
by constructivist authors such as Wendt offers new contributions to the field (Forster 
2002: 73). Hence, Forster (2002: 74) argues that “constructivist approaches have 
offered analytical tools for understanding how the concepts of „civilian control‟, 
„professionalization‟, „modernization‟ and „security sector reform‟, have been used 
as a means to transfer particular western values, ideas and institutions…” In the vein 
that Forster offers, in this thesis, I aim to use constructivist approach to examine the 
military‟s role in particular CMR settings. Hence, in following section, I examine 
constructivist literature‟s approach to role construction of the social actors.  
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2.2. Social Constructivist Literature 
  
In this section, I examine the general perspective of constructivist approach to social 
research. I search an answer to the question of “why process is important in social 
research”. Besides, I focus on how role construction process is considered in the 
constructivist literature. In this regard, we see that the constructivist scholars argue 
that there is a connection between the identity and the role and preferences of an 
actor. Thus, I examine the approach of several constructivist works to identity 
construction processes. 
Since this thesis suggests that using a social constructivist understanding in 
CMR theory would contribute to the CMR literature, it is worth exploring why this 
kind of an approach is relevant CMR studies. Green (2002: 4) states that rise of non-
state actors in a globalized structure of world are not explicable by the traditional 
approaches which tend to be generally state centric. Although states still have a 
considerable degree of sovereignty in various areas of politics, there are other 
dynamics such as non-governmental organizations, interest groups and non-state 
political actors that diminish and challenge the sovereignty of state. Furthermore, it is 
not possible to make a clear distinction between foreign and domestic politics, as 
traditional approaches keep foreign politics insular from domestic politics. This 
understanding requires a revision of conceptualization of concepts such as identity 
(Cable 1995). It can be asserted that in this new era, identity of political actors is not 
formed unilaterally, but with the effect of other actors in the political system. 
Secondly, the constructivist approach tends to include perceptions, culture and some 
other normative dimensions as inputs of theory building (Green 2002: 10). The 
constructivist approach takes any kind of relationship that constitutes the matter of 
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analysis as an outcome of a construction process. With this aspect, it may offer 
insights also into the different dimensions of the relationship between military and 
civilians.  
At this point, I would like to further elaborate the general aspects of the 
constructivist approach related to politics. The very difference of constructivist 
approach to social research lies in its conceptualization of social reality. Collin states 
that social reality is not a self-existing phenomenon but it is “generated by the way 
we think or talk about it (Collin 1997: 2).” According to this understanding, 
perceptions of various actors are inputs in the social reality. Constructivist literature 
includes different approaches towards the constitution of social reality. According to 
Wendt (1999), social facts are constituted by internal and external structures. Internal 
structures imply the inherited inputs in the existence of the fact. For instance, water 
is constituted by two hydrogen and one oxygen atoms. These are constant inputs. 
They are objective and not subject to any change throughout the process. Wendt 
argues that these are not antecedent conditions for existence but they rather make 
these facts possible. (p. 84). Thus, Wendt recognizes that existence of a fact includes 
an inherited and constant dimension. However, social facts are not only composed of 
these inherited and constant inputs. He emphasizes that it is not only the internal 
structure that constitutes the social facts. External effects hold an important place in 
the answer to “how-possible” questions. For instance, Wendt (1999: 313-316) 
scrutinizes the concept of power. According to him, power can be defined in material 
and subjective bases. The material conceptualization of power is based on 
measurable values, such as having strong and well developed military technology. 
These constitute the input in the existence of power that Wendt calls “internal 
structure”. Subjective conceptualization of the power, however, includes a social 
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dimension. In this dimension, different perceptions of power by various actors can be 
effective on the existence of power as a social fact.  
Although Wendt examines the concept of power in the area of international 
politics, his ideas can be applied to the study of military‟s political power. Military‟s 
political power can be defined according to the definition of its role in legal 
documents. However, with a constructivist approach, it can and should be analyzed 
with its different reflections within different actors‟ perception. According to Wendt 
(1999: 318), existence of social facts has a dual structure. For example, to define the 
concept of terrorism, there should be first a definition of legal use of violence. In 
other words, the concept of terrorism exists because there is a legalized use of 
violence, which is executed by the state. In sum, social facts are dependent on these 
internal factors, which are about the actor itself and external factors, which come 
from outside world.  
This approach to social theory symbolizes an absolute departure from the 
materialist definition of the social facts, because it does not only include the material 
value but also attributes importance to some other inputs as the constituent elements 
of the social facts. Once it is applied to the concepts of the civil-military relations, it 
gives the opportunity to analyze military‟s political power with its different 
dimensions. In this regard, the legal status of the military in the political system can 
constitute the input that Wendt calls internal structure of military‟s role in politics. 
Broad descriptions of military duty can enable military to carry its role beyond 
military affairs. However, it is not only legal status that constitutes the role of 
military. Some other external factors can be determinant on military‟s role. Thus, 
constructivist conceptualization of the social facts provides an opportunity of broader 
analysis on constitution of military‟s role.  
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Adler (1997: 321) argues that constructivism does not explain social world as 
the sum of simple behavioral responses of actors that emerge in a given set of 
conditions. Rather, the behavior of actors is shaped within the process in which 
material world gains meaning through the interpretation of social actors on material 
world. The material world is interpreted by actors through the shared knowledge, 
which is the outcome of the construction process. Thus, constructivism 
problematizes the process in which this shared knowledge has been continuously 
shaped. I will return to the vital place of the concept of “process” in the constructivist 
literature later.  
According to Adler, constructivism does not reject the existence of a material 
dimension within the social facts. Rather, it includes materiality as a constituent 
element of social facts. Material facts are interpreted and attributed meaning by 
actors and they become an integral part of the social facts. In other words, Adler 
argues that materiality constitutes the raw material of the social facts. Thus, Adler 
underlines that constructivism holds the “middle ground” between classical rational 
choice theories, which build the social reality on pure materiality, and post-
positivist/post-structuralist theories that rejects the materiality‟s place within the 
social reality.  
Finnemore and Sikkink (2001: 391) conceptualize constructivism as “an 
approach to social analysis that deals with the role of human consciousness on social 
life.” Inclusion of the human‟s logic within social theory brings a plurality to social 
reality. In this regard, “human interaction is primarily shaped by ideational factors 
but not material ones (p. 393).” Besides, the social facts that constructivism intends 
to analyze are not built on material bases but they exist because people collectively 
believe that they exist. For instance, the concept sovereignty is a power that we 
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attribute to the state. Thus, constructivist theorizing attributes importance of the 
perceptions of actors and this reference to perceptions requires recognition of social 
reality may vary depending on the context and structure. At this point, Finnemore 
and Sikkink underline the mutual constitution of the agents and structures. In 
constructivist approach, agents are not only shaped by structures but they are 
constituent elements of one another (2001: 394). The agents‟ perception of the 
structure reshapes the borders of structure, while structure restrains the agents to act 
in a particular context. Thus, they are in a continuous reproduction process.    
At this point, another corner stone concept in the constructivist approach, the 
process, is worth exploring. To conceptualize the social reality as the outcome of a 
process is general tendency in the constructivist literature. Constructivist literature 
also sheds light why the process is important. According to Wendt (1999), the 
process is determinant on the outcome. Roles, preferences and interests are not self-
existent concepts. The process is important, because actors, interests and identities 
are produced and reproduced within this process but they are not exogenously given 
to the actors. In other words, social facts are outcomes of processes. Wendt argues 
that identities, interests and roles of the social actors are continuously being shaped 
throughout the process (1999: 316). Thus, constructivist approach recognizes that 
outcome of the process is not static but continuously changing and dynamic. In this 
regard, Wendt attributes importance on the process to explain not only the outcome 
but also the social change. Since social facts are constructed continuously within the 
process, different variables can produce new outcomes. Hence, analysis of the 
process and exploration of the inputs that affect the evolution of the process provide 
the opportunity to examine the structural change in politics. However, Wendt 
recognizes that this structural change is difficult (p. 315). In this regard, Wendt 
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believes that although process is effective on the outcome, radical change in the 
outcome is not easily achieved. Wendt argues that asking a “how-question” is 
important to grasp the dynamics of the process. According to Wendt, how-questions 
intend to elaborate the process which puts an outcome. However, the word “how” 
alone does not necessarily add the process into the focus. His example on how 
question of “how did World War II start?” shows that such a question can be 
followed by a genetic and solely descriptive analysis. One can still answer this 
question with a pure descriptive assessment on the causal mechanisms that lead to 
the War. However, “how-possible” questions can direct the student into the process, 
which constructs the reasons and environment that made World War II possible 
(Wendt 1999: 83). Thus, a research based on constructivist approach should include 
questions which aim to examine the causal mechanisms through which those factors 
affect the dependent variable, by including a “how-possible” dimension.  
 Adler argues that process is a key concept to explain the difference between 
“being” and “becoming” (Adler 1991: 43). The difference between being and 
becoming is about the facts‟ way of existence. Being is the way of existence of 
natural facts. These are not subject to change. Constituent elements of these facts are 
constant and inherited, in other words, they are embedded within the natural 
phenomenon. Becoming, on the other hand, is the way of existence of social facts. 
Social facts do not come into existence in the same way that natural facts do. They 
are not pre-given. Constituent elements of these facts are social inputs, which are not 
constant and inherited. Thus, constructivist approach argues that social facts cannot 
be analyzed in the same way we approach to natural facts (1991: 46). In social 
research, according to Adler, to apprehend social facts better, the social inputs, which 
change depending on the context, should be analyzed. At this point, Adler states that 
 35 
 
the process is where all the social interaction among actors and social inputs happen. 
Thus, process in which different variables take part in the constitution of actors is a 
key concept in constructivist approach to social analysis. The approach that focuses 
on politics as an outcome of an interaction process facilitates the explanation of 
dynamism in the core of the social facts (1991: 47).    
 In this thesis, I explain the military‟s status within politics by explaining its 
role construction process. In this process, the role of military is constructed via the 
interaction among the actors of social process. Thus, in this section, I examine 
constructivist approach views role construction process of actors. 
An actor‟s role determines its preferences, ideas and approach toward social 
events. Scholars studying identity (Wendt 1994; Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995) argue 
that identity of the actor creates its preferences and decisions. Hence, in this section, 
I examine the constructivism‟s approach to identity.  
Constructivist approach to identity is based on the criticism of a Hobbesian 
approach to identity. Hobbesian conceptualization of identity and interest is built on 
the conservative assumptions of “self-interested” human nature. According to this 
view, specific patterns of behavior can be expected from the actors in a given 
structure of conditions (Fierke and Wiener 1999: 723). This is the necessity of the 
pre-given and inherited nature of the actors. In this regard, actors are self-interested 
and this characteristic is embedded in their existence. Thus, roles of the actors are 
“prescribed by the pre-existing cultures” and dynamics of the actors‟ role can be 
rooted in human nature (Epstein 2010: 339). As a result, this approach takes identity 
and interests as constant and fixed beyond borders, which are determined by pre-
given structures. However, there is a strong emphasis of dynamism of identity in 
constructivist literature. According to Abrams and Hog (1990), a social actor takes a 
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social role and develops its preferences concertedly with its social identity. Hence, 
interests, preferences and social role of an actor are inseparable from its social 
identity. Besides, the social identity of an actor is not the result of any pre-given 
structure, such as human nature; rather it is constructed within the process in which 
social actors interact (1990: 21). Thus, the process of identity construction 
determines the role of the actor. In this regard, I further elaborate the concept of 
identity and how it is constituted to analyze the role construction process in the 
constructivist literature.  
Similar to Abrams and Hog, Alexander Wendt argues that interests and 
preferences of an actor depend on its identity (1994: 385). Thus, he states that 
identity is the key concept to analyze an actor‟s position in the social structure. 
Wendt (1994) defines the identity as a dynamic concept. He underlines that identity 
is the product of the process in which actors interact, change and reproduce their 
identities. It is continuously produced and reproduced within this construction 
process. Thus, analysis of the process facilitates to see an actor‟s changing patterns 
of action. Wendt‟s construction is based on the critique of understanding that 
attributes some exogenously given characteristics to the actors. According to his 
approach to identity, interests and preferences of the actors are not naturally given to 
them but they are constructed within the process. They are not the result of any pre-
existing structure such as human nature. Rather, interaction among the actors shapes 
the identities, may change them within the process and create new sets of interests. 
Still, Wendt avoids an over-socialized approach to the constitution of the identity 
(1994: 384). Thus, he distinguishes the constitution of the identity into corporate and 
social constitutions. “Social identities are sets of meanings that an actor attributes to 
itself while taking the perspective of others as a social object (1994: 385).” 
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According to Wendt, social identities are affected by the process, constructed by the 
interaction with other actors and therefore, they are subject to change within the 
context of construction process. The actor perceives its social role and interests, 
develops policies and act in accordance with this social identity. Since Wendt argues 
that social identity is subject to construction via interaction among actors that is key 
link in the mutual constitution of the actors‟ identities. An actor may have multiple 
social identities which enable it to act in different forms and take roles according to 
conditions. On the other hand, process has a limited effect on the corporate identities. 
According to Wendt, corporate identity shapes the intrinsic interests of the actor. 
This dimension of the identity includes given elements which occur as a result of the 
actor‟s existence. For example, an actor naturally has the interest to protect its 
physical and ontological security. This interest, according to Wendt, can be seen in 
the identity of each actor. Such interests have a limited “constructedness” and they 
are independent of the social context that is based on interaction. In the absence of 
these elements, actor‟s identity is not explored. Thus, for further construction of the 
identity, corporate interests should be explored by the actor. In other words, 
according to Wendt, exploration of the given and intrinsic corporate interests is one 
step prior to the process in which identity is further constructed and reproduced. 
Even so, Wendt‟s approach to identity is dynamic. Identities and interests are always 
in process and reproduced via interaction among the actors. There may be seen 
relative stability in those; nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that they are 
given. Rather, this stable period can be “ongoing accomplishment of practices”, 
which are elements of identity construction process (Wendt 1994: 386).  
Eisenstadt and Giesen (1995: 73) have a similar approach to the constitution 
of the identity. They argue that “identity represents a reference by which costs and 
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benefits are defined and within the framework of which preferences are constructed.” 
They assume that the actor‟s set of practices emerge as a result of this constructed 
identity. In other words, the actor takes a role, practices this role and creates its 
preferences in accordance with its constructed identity. Similar to Wendt, interaction 
among the actors is a key concept also for Eisenstadt and Giesen, in their approach to 
the process which shapes the identity of the actors. They conceptualize identity as 
follows: “It is the intentional or non-intentional consequence of interaction [that is] 
socially patterned and structured (1995: 74).” The identity construction process is not 
only about the actor itself but also contributed by all other actors which interact 
within the process. Identity of a particular actor includes inputs which evolved with 
the effect of other actors. Conceptualizing the identity as a product of interactive 
process brings two important consequences. Firstly, since it is constructed within the 
process, identity becomes a dynamic concept, which changes throughout the process. 
Secondly, since the product of the process is constructed via the interaction among 
the actors, the identity of each actor is mutually constituted by different actors‟ 
contribution as similar to Wendt‟s approach to identity construction.  
Eisenstadt and Giesen argue that identity construction aims to create a 
similarity among the members of this identity (1995: 74). Social practices such as 
ceremonial rituals are used as tools of creating similarity within this process. Most 
important part in the identity construction is to define the “inside” and the “outside” 
(1995: 75). They argue that constructing the borders of intended identity constitutes 
the core of the identity formation process (1995: 74-75). According to them, as 
touched upon above, the identity is dynamic and thus subject to change. However, 
they underline that the process in which identities are constructed starts with the 
exploration of self-evident and given elements of spatial, temporal and individual 
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dimensions. At this point, Eisenstadt and Giesen predict that there are primordial 
roots of the actor‟s existence as a social object, as similar to Wendt‟s emphasis on 
corporate interests. The identity of the actor starts with the self-exploration of the 
“here”, “now” and “I” (1995: 76). These are primordial and exogenously given 
elements of the identity. They are objective and unquestionable, thus not subject to 
change (1995: 76). They note that primordial elements constitute the first ideal type 
of collective identity. For example, the clan identity is based on the exploration of 
the kinship, which is a given and natural type of characteristic. In this regard, it can 
be asserted that although Eisenstadt and Giesen define identity as a dynamic concept, 
they argue that its construction starts with the exploration of constant and given 
elements.  
Either “primordial elements” underlined by Eisenstadt and Giesen or 
“corporate interests” touched upon by Wendt are constant, independent of 
construction and the authors argue that these are prior to the process which shape the 
identity. According to Zehfuss (2001), such an approach towards the identity‟s roots 
has the potential to undermine its constructedness. Zehfuss criticizes Wendt‟s 
approach to identity and underlines that his recognition of “givenness” in the root of 
identity undermines his constructivism. She states that “Wendt needs identity to be 
constructed but at the same time in some ways given (2001: 316).” Identity is 
important to examine the basis for interests. In this regard, Zehfuss is in an 
agreement with Wendt about identity‟s significance in the analysis. She agrees that 
conceptions of self and other and consequently interests of the actors are shaped 
through the interactive process. Thus, interests of the actors are the results of the 
identity. General patterns of practices among the actors do not emerge as natural 
facts but they are shaped and reshaped within the process. However, Wendt‟s 
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approach to given “corporate interests” makes his conceptualization conservative and 
restrains its construction. Zehfuss summarizes Wendt‟s approach to identity 
construction in three steps of which one represents “givenness” while two are based 
on interactive dimensions. “Signaling” is the first step where the actor notices given 
corporate interests. This step is the beginning of the existence of the actor as a social 
object. Following two steps are interactive: Interpretation and response. 
Interpretation of other actors about a particular actor‟s existence and response to this 
existence are two elements of the interaction process. While the first step is directly 
about the actor, following two steps include the perceptions and perspectives of other 
actors. Furthermore, while first step is given and primordial, latter steps are 
interactive and available for further change. Thus, Zehfuss criticizes Wendt‟s 
construction process of being limited only to outside world and conservative about 
actor‟s own existence. The first step, which Wendt takes as prior to interaction 
process, is not subject to change through process. The process has the potential to 
reshape latter steps of the construction. Thus, Zehfuss argues that Wendt‟s approach 
to identity construction process is not general enough to explain the structural 
changes in the identity. Rather, the construction that Wendt analyzes is the 
behavioral changes of the actors (2001: 319). After all, Zehfuss‟ criticism on 
Wendt‟s emphasis of given dimension of the identity, namely the corporate interests, 
can be taken as a general counter-argument for identity‟s limited construction.        
As similar to the general constructivist assumption, Checkel also argues that 
the study of politics is not just about the structure composed of actors with fixed 
given preferences, rather a contextual analysis of the process which reshapes and 
changes the preferences is needed (Checkel 1999). In this regard, the role and 
preferences of an actor is bound to the output derived from the construction process, 
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namely the identity. He emphasizes three schools of thought about identity 
formation. Rational choice school is based on the assumption that actors are 
constrained on the behavior derived from pre-given self-interested motivations. 
Historical institutionalist, on the other hand, actors are rational but institutions can 
affect the actor‟s way of existence in a long term. In this process, institutions can be 
both intervening and independent variables. Thus, it recognizes the changeability of 
the preferences. Finally, sociological institutionalist approach argues that institutions 
shape the identity and interests of the actors not only in a distant future but in a near-
term. Checkel brings an institutionalist emphasis to interest and identity formation. 
He believes that institutions can be dominant sociological structures that have the 
potential to reproduce the general context of interaction. Thus, institutions are not 
only agents that are produced within the process; rather they construct and change 
the game of politics (Checkel 1999: 547). As a result, they can be independent 
variables, which are influential on the output that is the identity of the actors. His 
approach to the process is different from Wendt‟s. According to him, in the former 
constructivist literature, the process is defined as where random interaction among 
actors happens. However, he argues that the process is not based on random 
interaction; rather there is an asymmetry among the actors of interaction in the 
manner that broader institutional contexts such as norms and discursive structures are 
more capable to reshape the identities (1999: 549). Through the process in which 
institutional structures have a dominant influence on the output, the actors acquire 
new interests and preferences (1999: 548). At this point, Checkel also problematizes 
the effectiveness of the interaction process. According to him, the process shapes the 
identity of the actors when there is a high density of interaction. Continuousness of 
the interaction is an independent variable, which affects the output, the identity. In 
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sum, Checkel‟s approach to identity formation systematizes the patterns of 
relationship between actors of interaction process, and does not take the process as 
the set of random interaction in which actors have equal inputs. 
Fierke and Wiener (1999) problematize a more specific point in the identity 
and interest formation. They focus on how institutional identities and interests are 
transformed (1999: 723). They build on a “Wittgensteinian” constructivist approach. 
They agree with the general argument shared in the constructivist literature: “context 
of social and cultural norms shapes actor identity and behavior. (1999: 723).” 
Besides, they recognize the inseparability of identities and interests. However, they 
criticize the identity conceptualization of sociological constructivists, such as Wendt. 
They believe that although Wendt criticizes the rational choice model‟s explanation 
of interest formation, he also takes rationality prior to the development of any 
identity formation process. Referring to Wendt‟s approach, they state that “in (such) 
constructivist accounts, meanings are instrumentally deployed by rational actors or 
rationality appears to be prior to the development of any shared context of meaning. 
(1999:724).” In other words, in Wendt‟s corporate interests, we encounter an actor 
which makes rational calculations of cost-benefit and attributes itself a given set of 
interests and preferences. According to Fierke and Wiener, this understanding 
remains limited to explain the preferences of actors which are beyond the 
calculations of material benefits. They build on Wittgensteinian understanding of 
interest formation “where meaning and language are central to the constitution of 
identity and interests (1999: 724).” According to this approach, norms and context 
are reduced to “causes” of constructed identity in Wendt‟s conceptualization. While 
Wendt questions what kind of outcome can be expected as a result of the identity 
construction process in which norms and context are social inputs, Fierke and Wiener 
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problematize the context itself by asking “in what kind of context the outcome would 
be meaningful (1999: 725).” To elaborate the context, they use Kratochwil‟s 
emphasis on discourse and meaning. According to this approach, the discourse is the 
constituent element of identity and interest formation. Kratochwil argues that saying 
something is doing something (Kratochwil 1989: 8; Fierke and Wiener 1999: 727). 
However, language itself cannot be the focus of analysis to examine the identity 
formation. There is a relation between the meaning of the discourse and the context 
of the process. The discourse can have different meanings in different contexts. 
Furthermore, the discourse is not always observed in the form of language. 
Sometimes, practices of an actor can carry discursive meanings (Kratochwil 1989: 
14). For instance, military exercise of a state can be a direct message to another state, 
although it is not delivered in the form of words.  
 Since there is a direct relationship between the context and the meaning of the 
discourse, changing context will naturally change the meaning of the interests and 
identities. In sum, identities and interests are constituted not only by the norms and 
other social inputs, but the relationship between the context of the process and the 
discourse of the actors may attribute new meanings to identities.  
 
 2.3. Turkish Civil-Military Relations 
 
Since problems regarding civil-military relations have been a “never-ending” issue in 
Turkey, plenty of studies have been published to analyze Turkish military‟s position 
in politics. Much of them agree on that Turkish Armed Forces‟ position in Turkish 
politics cannot be observed as dependent from the position of army in Turkish 
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history (Tachau 1983; Heper 1996; Narlı 2000). Researchers on Turkish military 
agree on that the roots of the strong position of TAF can be observed in its active role 
in the “evolution of the social, economic and political structure of the Turkish state 
(Karabelias 1999: 130).”  
Tachau and Heper (1983) correlate the military‟s strong presence in Turkish 
politics with two factors. Firstly, as similar to general agreement in Turkish CMR 
literature, armed forces‟ historical position in Turkish history enables military to 
exercise a wide range of political power compared to European armies. Tachau and 
Heper argue that the roots of military‟s privileged position in Turkish society go even 
back to pre-Ottoman times. According to them, Muslim culture recognizes that army 
is an integral part of the community and over-glorifies its status as the saver. Thus, 
credibility that is attributed by Turkish society to the military is not only derived 
from army‟s strong presence in Ottoman social life, but also because Turkish society 
is the heirs of Muslim culture (1983: 18). The prominent role that military took in 
modernization movements in 18
th
 and 19
th
 century also reinforced its position and 
turned military to an essential part of Turkish political life. Secondly, Turkish 
political culture is based on a high esteem to authority. “Turkish political culture has 
traditionally placed great value to governmental authority. No group could be 
expected to take this matter more seriously than the military (1983: 26).” Thus, 
Turkish Armed Forces filled the need of a strong political authority, which is a part 
of Turkish political culture, with the effect of its historical position in Turkish culture 
and politics. According to Tachau and Heper, the position of TAF can be classified 
somewhere between “moderator”, “guardian” and “ruler” military models (1983: 21). 
According to Nordlinger‟s classification of armies, moderator and guardian army 
models are based on the conservative goal to preserve the prevailing status quo and 
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intervene in politics rather than seizing the power overtly like ruler army models. 
Looking at the three direct interventions of TAF until 1983, which is the year their 
article was published, Tachau and Heper puts TAF somewhere different from ruler 
army‟s of Latin America, although it is involved in direct governing mechanisms 
between 1960 and 1961, and between 1980 and 1983. Thus, according to Tachau and 
Heper, TAF can be classified as an army model which has moderator and 
guardianship functions due to its historical position within Turkish political culture, 
as well as a ruler army, which take over the governing mechanisms for particular 
time periods.   
Historical legacy is an important factor that facilitates Turkish military to 
extend its role into civilian politics. However, Brown (1989) argues that this 
dimension alone cannot explain the all factors that led TAF to intervene politics. 
Actually, it was Mustafa Kemal who forced military out of politics and envisaged a 
political system in which military do not intervene into political processes.. 
However, Turkish military remained as a crucial element in Turkish domestic 
politics (Brown 1989: 400). Especially with late 1950‟s, it continuously kept a 
watchful eye on civilian governments. Since, Mustafa Kemal‟s ideas, which locate 
military outside of politics, are part of military‟s historical legacy, later political 
activism of TAF, which turned into three direct interventions to political process, 
needs explanation. In other words, historical legacy can explain political activism of 
Turkish military to some extent. Brown examines the officer recruitment patterns of 
TAF to see ties between its strong political position and composition of the officer 
corps. Brown observes that the officer corps of TAF is generally representative of 
wide range Turkish society (Brown 1989: 392-396). As a result of this representation 
capacity, they are attributed an important esteem from the rest of the society. 
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According to Brown (1989: 400), TAF “is sincere in its attachment to the democratic 
process and its concern that it works effectively.” However, since military‟s role in 
the existence of the liberated nation is prominent, it keeps exercising high degree of 
autonomy. With the effect of its social representation capacity, military‟s 
engagement with political processes is only challenged by a limited proportion of the 
society. As a result, Brown argues that justification of TAF‟s guardianship role is the 
result of its officer corps‟ composition (Brown 1989: 401).  
Karabelias (1999: 139) argues that the special role of military, guarding the 
regime, caused military turn to a class within the society, just as worker class or 
peasant class. In such a structure, military has been capable to reproduce itself, renew 
its description of duty in accordance with the political conjuncture and determine its 
values with “minimum interference” of civilian segments of the society. This 
situation facilitated military to reinforce its inner cohesion and determine an identity. 
The officer corps, which Brown claims representing the general structure of Turkish 
society, constituted the core of this class.   
Later studies are focused on bringing theoretical explanations to Turkish 
military‟s strong political positions. Meanwhile, the tendency to correlate military‟s 
strong position with its historical narrative remained popular. Narlı (2000) also 
emphasizes the relationship between army‟s historical legacy and strong position of 
Turkish Armed Forces in politics. According to Narlı, TAF‟s strong presence in the 
politics and society is the result of two essential factors. Firstly, Turkish military has 
appeared as defender of the national unity and secular democracy. Secondly, 
although the republican system decreed the equality of all citizens regardless of their 
differences, structure of Turkish society has been based on the vertically organized 
hierarchic Ottoman society system, in which armed forces find itself a room in the 
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ruling class (2000: 108). Besides, Narlı underlines military‟s prominent role in the 
Turkish modernization and the liberation process. These factors facilitate military to 
exercise a strong position as a privileged institution in Turkish state organization. 
However, the question of “why/when military intervenes in politics” still needs 
explanation. Narlı uses Schiff‟s Concordance model to explain the conflictual nature 
of Turkish civil-military relations. As mentioned in 2.1., Schiff‟s Concordance 
Theory predicts that agreement of three segments of society –military, political elites 
and citizenry- on four indicators –composition of the officer corps, decision-making, 
recruitment method and military style- decreases the likelihood of military 
intervention. In this regard, Narlı explains the unstable nature of Turkish civil-
military relations with the “fragile concordance” among three segments of Turkish 
society on four indicators. The partnership among military, political elites and 
citizenry have been fragile due to the military‟s privileged position within Turkish 
political system, with the effect of its historical position and its position as the guard 
of the national unity and secular democracy (2000: 318).   
More recent studies on Turkish civil-military relations recognize that with 
early 2000‟s, the pattern of civil-military relations in Turkey started to change 
(Demirel 2005; Satana 2008; Aydınlı 2010). In this new period, option of the military 
intervention started gradually fall off the agenda of Turkish politics. Demirel (2005) 
argues that this new understanding is derived from the Turkish society‟s past 
experiences of military interventions. According to Demirel (2005: 246), “nature of 
an outgoing authoritarian regime has a significant impact on a new democracy.” In 
this regard, the past experiences of military regimes in Turkey contributed the 
democratic environment, which undermined the military‟s role. Demirel observes 
that the reason that Turkish military is credited by society is not only about military 
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and its historical narration that puts military into the hearth of nation‟s existence. 
Once we talk about societal judgment toward a regime type, it is inevitable to ignore 
the perceptions and normative values of society. According to Demirel (2005: 253), 
society makes comparison between democratically elected civilian governments and 
military regime, once the military intervenes. In Turkish case, while civilian 
government periods represent conflictual stalemates, economic collapses and 
corruption, military interventions have been seen as pragmatic and fast solutions to 
the deadlocks that civilians caused. In other words, civilian governments were so 
discredited that military interventions became a viable option in the perception of 
both society and military itself. However, these past experiences contributed to 
accumulation of democratic knowledge both in civilians and military elites. Thus, the 
new relatively democratic era, which started with the early 2000‟s, utilized this 
accumulation of democratic knowledge.  
Satana (2008) observes a change in the patterns of civil-military relations in 
Turkey. According to Satana (2008: 357), the democracy in Turkey is passing 
through a consolidation process with the contribution of “lengthy but persistent 
transformation of the military.” Satana (2008: 358-359) argues that democratization 
process is composed of two phases: transition and consolidation. Building on Linz 
and Stepan, democratic transition can be accounted to be complete when civilian 
government is elected in the free elections. Thus, Turkey has passed through and 
completed the transition period long ago. According to Satana (2008: 358), Turkey is 
“still struggling in the consolidation phase.” In this phase she observes a diminishing 
tendency in the effect of the military over Turkish politics. At this point, Satana 
establishes the correlation between democratic consolidation and military‟s role on 
politics as different from the general assumption in the democratization literature, 
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that democratic consolidation diminishes military‟s role. According to her, 
democratic consolidation gained momentum in Turkey with the contribution of 
military‟s own commitment to transformation. She argues that (2008: 382) “Turkish 
military has been going through a gradual transformation of its behaviors to the 
society and civilian government” and this attitudinal change contributes the 
democratization of the political system in Turkey. Thus, diminishing effect of the 
military is not only the consequence of democratic consolidation but military‟s own 
transformation is also one of the significant contributors of this consolidation 
process.  
 Aydınlı (2009) agrees on that the common point in the literature that the 
Turkish society has seen the army as the ultimate guard of the regime. However, he 
also adds that “Turkey has been undergoing major democratic transformations 
(Aydınlı 2009: 581).” In this new era, the nature of the relationship between military 
and civilians is subject to change as well as the general paradigm of the politics. 
However, the question is whether TAF will adapt its new role in this new era. 
According to Aydınlı, position of TAF in Turkish society and politics does not fit 
with the four models of military typologies, namely European, Former Soviet, Latin 
American and American models. Rather, the military constitutes a protector of the 
regime, which is based on secular unitary state model. Aydınlı argues that this 
guardianship role satisfied throughout the republican era the expectancies of the 
society, which is constructed with the effect of two factors. Firstly, since Turkish 
military is recruitment method is based on a conscript army model, the credibility of 
the army among the societal segments has been always high. Secondly, the military 
also manipulated the hot topics of Turkish political agenda such as separatist 
terrorism and political Islam, to legitimize its strong presence within political issues. 
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Besides, the relationship between army and the society in Turkey is built on a 
centuries-long historical experience, in which military took political roles many 
times (Aydınlı 2009: 592-595). Although, the popularity of the military did not 
altered in this new era, Aydınlı argues that political reforms diminished the role of 
military and liberalized the political system in Turkey. Furthermore, Aydınlı calls 
this change a “paradigmatic shift” in the nature of the relationship between army and 
civilians and claims that coup era is closed in Turkey.  
 Review of the literature on Turkish civil-military relations shows that there is 
a general agreement on that Turkish military‟s strong presence can be correlated with 
its historical role in Turkish modernization. Turkish military exercised a high degree 
of autonomy during some particular periods of republican era. However, another 
agreement point is that the nature of the civil-military relations in Turkey has been in 
a transformation since almost a decade. The nature of this alteration in the civil-
military relations in Turkey begs an explanation, which this thesis seeks to analyze. 
The following section discusses the opportunities derived from three distinct 
literatures.  
 
2.4. Gaps in the Literature and Opportunities for Further Theory Building 
 
Reviews of distinct literature give us the opportunity to identify the gaps in these 
literatures and build an efficient theoretical framework to explain the military‟s role 
in a constructional context.  
 In the CMR literature, the general tendency is to take the relationship between 
military and civilians as inherently conflictual. In other words, civil-military relations 
field is built on the possibility of military intervention to civilian process, if the 
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military is not controlled by civilian authorities. Yet, Schiff challenges this argument 
by stating that the relationship between military and civilians is not always built on a 
conflictual base as presented in Huntington‟s argument. In this regard, the concept of 
civilian control remains bound to specific cases. In some cases, the relationship can 
be built on a co-operative base, may be in the form of civil-military partnership. 
According to Schiff, the cultural issues are important in the construction of the core 
of relationship between military and civilians. This is important in terms of bringing 
cultural relativity dimension to CMR literature. Actually, scholars of CMR have been 
predicting factors that affect the military‟s role in the politics. They present several 
independent variables, which they claim increase or diminish the role of military in 
politics. Huntington argued that challenging external threat environment can increase 
the likelihood of a strong military model. Desch, on the other hand, stated that a 
military that faces external threat shall focus on the issues such as national security; 
thus, external threats have a diminishing effect on military‟s political role. Rather, he 
argued that internal threats may increase the likelihood of a political army. Janowitz 
claimed that isolation of the army from civilian segments of the society may cause 
politicization of the army, due to its discrete role in its inner processes. The isolation 
of army from the rest of the society deepens the gap between civilian and military 
worlds, and this increasing gap can cause a conflict in civil-military relations.  
 These are all independent variables, which CMR scholars argued to be 
effective on military‟s role. Still, these are presented as piecemeal arguments of their 
theoretical framework. Claim of such an independent variable means actually that in 
the absence of these variables, a different set of military role may appear. That shows 
that military‟s role is not inherited or fixed but shaped with the effect of several 
inputs. Constructivist literature sheds light to this role construction function of social 
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inputs. According to constructivist approach, roles and interests of the actors are not 
fixed or naturally embedded in the existence of the actors. Role of an actor is 
determined in accordance with its identity, which is the outcome of the construction 
process. At this point, the process is where social inputs interactively create an 
outcome. The thesis of “co-constitution” mentioned above presents opportunities to 
discover the social inputs that constitute the identities, policies and ideologies of the 
actors. In this regard, the identities of the actors may include “primordial elements”, 
which are pre-given and prior to the construction process. However, the process may 
alter the preferences and roles of the actors. Military is also an actor, which puts 
inputs into the process as well as shaped by it. Thus, constructivist approach offers 
opportunities to grasp the structural changes in the military‟s role. Besides, it 
provides ground for a wider analysis of military‟s interaction with different segments 
of the society.  
 Looking at the literature on Turkish civil-military relations, we see that 
scholars grasp that strong presence of Turkish Armed Forces within politics is built 
on a historical narrative, in which the army took active roles in nation-building and 
modernization processes. Second point that scholars agree is the presence of the 
support that is attributed to the military‟s engagement with politics by the society. 
The army has been in a privileged position in the perception of Turkish society. 
Many scholars (Brown 1989; Narlı 2000; Heper 1996) argued that the popularity of 
the army in the Turkish society is also a consequence of the historical position of the 
military.  Demirel (2005) correlated this popularity of army is the consequence of the 
failure of the civilian politicians. Finally, third point that can be observed in the 
literature is that the pattern of the civil-military relations of 2000‟s in Turkey is 
different from the period started with 1980 coup. This change is related with the well 
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functioning of democratic process in post 2001 period (Demirel 2005), the 
transformation in the military‟s self-perception and democratic consolidation in 
Turkey, and finally with a paradigmatic shift in the nature of the civil-military 
relations in Turkey.  
 At this point, a constructivist approach to military‟s role may contribute to the 
literature by shedding light to the process in which different patterns of civil-military 
relations are constructed. Specifically in Turkish case, the guardianship role of the 
military is underlined by scholars of Turkish CMR. Then, the question is what social 
inputs have been effective in the construction of this role? How have these inputs 
been used as social instruments? How have they affected the social process in which 
military‟s identity, societal perception and political position of the military‟s 
constructed? On the other hand, if we are talking about a change in the civil-military 
relations with the beginning of the 2000‟s, this implies that a new construction 
process is being passed through, which produces a different outcome. Why such a 
new process has started? Which different social inputs have been effective in this 
new process?   
After all, constructivist approach requires taking the military‟s intervention into 
civilian sphere is the result of such a construction of military‟s identity. A broader 
analysis should focus on the dimension of how this role is constructed. The 
difference between an interventionist army and a democratically controlled army lies 
in the differently evolved roles of these two army typologies. Thus, the theory should 
seek exploring the factors affecting the role construction process. Also, in the 
existing literature, military‟s role is evaluated generally on an institutional base. 
However, military is also a social actor. The institutional base on the military is 
useful to understand the inner conditions of military. However, within a social 
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constructivist framework, institutional definitions of the military‟s role are just one 
part in the formation of its general role in the society and politics. The core of the 
relationship between military and other societal actors is also directly related with the 
social construction of the military, its role and its perception in different domains. 
Any kind of relationship between military and civilians –conflictual or stable- is not 
a natural existence but an outcome of a constructed process. Hence, the theory should 
discover how these actors shape one another‟s structure. Finally, literature takes the 
civilian and political segments under the same unit of society, as civilian. As Schiff 
indicates, in several models, it is not unusual to see dramatic differences among 
civilians, political leaders and military in terms of perceptions. In some cases, two of 
these actors can act co-operatively while one has a different attitude, or each of these 
three actors can have discrete positions. Therefore, political sphere should be 
analyzed distinctively from civilians and military, although it constitutes an integral 
part of the society.  
In the next chapter, I focus on the Turkish case as a “theory-building case” to 
examine different processes of military‟s role construction.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
THEORY-BUILDING CASE STUDY: SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF TURKISH CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS 
 
 
 
3.1 Theoretical Contribution of the Case Study  
 
Armed forces have been established as a modern institution to provide a self-guard 
to state. While the nation-state model has been changing since Westphalia, the 
structure of the military has also been subject to change in its context and nature. 
Military‟s relationship to the civilian world constitutes the core of civil-military 
relations studies. Peter Feaver explains the classical debate of CMR as the scholarly 
effort to guard the civilians from the institution that was founded to guard the 
civilians (Feaver 1992). Thus, as the previous chapter shows, existing literature on 
CMR focuses more on the problem of keeping the military subject to civilian 
supremacy and less on how military‟s role in a society is constructed. Anthony 
Forster names this former understanding of civil-military relations scholarship as 
the “old Civil-Military Relations” (2002), while Rebecca Schiff refers to it as 
“normal theory of CMR” (Schiff 2011). This approach to CMR can be challenged 
in terms of several points. 
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First, the focus of “Old CMR” has been narrow and conservative. Civil-
military relations are a field, which has come into vogue especially in the Cold War 
era. This era was predominantly shaped by the perception of the threat coming from 
an external party. Hence, the focus of CMR was undoubtedly affected from the 
security concepts of the Cold War paradigm. Specific case studies, as well as 
theoretical works, were written in a paradigm which was shaped by the Cold War‟s 
security perceptions. Since these concepts were defined in such an era, military 
definitions of these concepts have come forward (Burk 2002: 9). The construction 
of these definitions has caused politically active military models, which have 
tendency to guide political process in accordance with the militarily defined 
security concepts.  
Accordingly, in the western world, where CMR field has been intensively 
studied, the field is based on the analysis of conflictual relations with military and 
civilians. For example, according to Hendrickson, development of civil-military 
relations field is directly related with the American Military‟s over engagement 
with the political process especially in early 1970‟s (Hendrickson 1988). On the 
other hand, it was the military itself, which was seen as the guardian of the political 
system in the Second World. The Soviet system was based on a huge bureaucratic 
guarding elite in which military constituted the most important and vivid 
cornerstone (Taylor 2003: 175-205). As a result of this era, CMR scholars narrowed 
the focus of the field to the problem of controlling the military in the democratic 
political system. The relationship between military and civilians has been defined in 
an inherently conflictual way. The demise of the Cold War paradigm rendered this 
conservative CMR understanding narrow. Rather the “new” civil-military relations 
studies should cover the issues not only as a conflictual sphere between military 
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and civilians but also as an interactive area in which each actor has an effect on 
other actors‟ role, if possible in a partnership context (Schiff 1995). 
Secondly, in the existing CMR literature, institutions have been main 
referent objects. According to Forster (2002),  scholars coming from realist and 
neo-realist school in the CMR field have an understanding that states are the major 
actors which shape the political structure. Thus, the civilian part of the CMR is 
considered as the institutions that are formed by civilians, which constitute the 
civilian wing of the state structure. According to Buzan and Waever‟s securitization 
theory of international relations, since the major referent object has been the state in 
former security studies, security is expectably conceptualized in a state-centric 
approach in world affairs (Buzan and Weaver 2009).  
Although Buzan and Waever tackle international relations, the outcome of 
such a state-centric approach to politics leads to the neglect of the differentiation of 
citizenry and civil society from the civilian political institutions in domestic 
political studies. As a result of the strict institutionalist emphasis in the field, vast 
majority of the CMR scholarship focused on the nature of relation between military 
and political institutions. This is not problematic from an analytical institutionalist‟s 
point of view that presupposes that institutions shape the society and, as a result, 
represent the cleavages within the society.  
However, this understanding has limitations. Rebecca Schiff (1995; 2009) 
argues that current CMR theories rely on political institutions as the main civilian 
component of analysis and neglect the differentiation between the opinions of 
political institutions and citizenry (1995: 13). For example, according to data 
presented in Kull et al., the public support for Iraq War was as low as 30% in the 
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countries which sided with the U.S., while political authorities of these countries 
were in alliance with the U.S. administration (Kull, Ramsay et al. 2004).  
Another example of the discrepancy has been experienced in Turkey in 
2003, during the debate about sending troops to Iraq. After getting the absolute 
majority in the Parliament in 2002 elections,
3
 Justice and Development Party (JDP) 
faced the decision of whether to support U.S. in a possible operation to Iraq. After 
several meetings in the U.S., the government decided to support the Iraqi operation. 
However, this caused a visible negative attitude in Turkish public opinion (Gordon 
and Shapiro 2004: 76-81). As a result, the strong antiwar public opinion showed its 
effect in the Parliament, and the proposal was rejected by not only the votes of 
opposition party but also the, JDP‟s parliamentarians4. In sum, the civilians that are 
mostly considered as unitary do not always react to political decisions in the same 
way.  
The civilian control of the military is consolidated via the institutions. These 
institutions, which are components of civilian bureaucracy, should develop an 
institutional memory to be efficient control mechanisms (Forster 2002: 77). On the 
other hand, the institutional memory of the military is another important condition 
to maintain a stable civil-military interaction. Construction of these memories 
occurs within a process in which civilian and military components of the analysis 
get into interaction in different domains.  
In the light of these points, in this chapter I aim to carry out an analysis of 
the construction of the military‟s role in the Turkish political system by 
concentrating on processes instead of outcomes. In this analysis, the focus is not 
                                                          
3 JDP got the 34.7% of the votes in the elections; however, due to the 10% election barrier, it 
got the 371 of the 550 seats in the Parliament.  
4http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/bASjtdmm2MHxi_x2F_6lgnekLw_x3D__
x3D_ (Last Access: 20.07.2011) 
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only the relationship between military and political system, rather I extend the 
scope of analysis into three domains of analysis. First, it is important to discover 
how military perceives its own role and which steps it follows to construct its own 
identity. Thus, analyzing the self-perception of military on its role in the political 
system is important in terms of elaborating the process in which military‟s role is 
constructed (Nunn 1995). Self-perception is also important to analyze the changing 
role of military (Perlmutter 1980: 99). For example, so called “Redemocratization” 
of the Latin American regimes is directly related with the reconstruction of the self-
perception of the Latin American armies (Perlmutter 1980: 103).  
Secondly, I analyze the construction of military‟s role in the societal 
domain. This domain is divided into two divisions: Political sphere and citizenry. I 
focus on these two divisions of the society separately. In this context, I elaborate 
the question of how the military‟s role is constructed in the perception of the 
society. According to Rosen, society and the societal perception of the political 
concepts matter in terms of determining the military‟s position both in internal and 
external politics (Rosen 1995). Hence, the empirical data, which show how 
militarily defined concepts are perceived by the civilian segments is utilized to 
contribute to the theoretical framework.  
Finally, the external factors‟ effect on military‟s position in the political 
system is elaborated. In civil-military relations theory literature, the external factors 
have been examined generally on the basis of the threat concept. It is generally 
accepted that if the state is under certain external threats and feels itself insecure, its 
military is more likely to have political power in internal politics (Huntington 1957; 
Janowitz 1960; Feaver 1992). On the other hand, Desch suggests a counter 
argument. Desch‟s main argument is that there will be greater civilian and military 
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disunity, and a consequent weakening of civilian control in a less challenging 
external threat environment (Desch 2008). However, external relations of the 
country with international organizations, which develop its own criteria of civil-
military relations, such as European Union, is also an important factor on the role of 
this country‟s military. In this context, I examine the Turkish case in the order 
mentioned above.  
 
3.2. Role Construction Process of Military 
 
Military‟s role in the political system is associated to its position in that political 
system. This role is either constructed or attributed to it by different actors. 
According to an interpretivist approach, an actor‟s way of existence is not only 
related to its own attitude but also to other actors‟ perception of this actor (Green 
2002: 14). In other words, existence is also the outcome of how it is narrated by 
different actors. This approach is applicable to analysis of military‟s position in the 
society. In this section, as previously explained, I carry out an analysis on the 
construction of Turkish Armed Forces‟ role in three domains. The first domain of 
analysis focuses on organizational domain: military‟s self-construction of its role.  
The second one is the societal domain, which I separated into two: Political sphere 
and citizenry and I analyze how these two civilian domains constructed the 
military‟s identity.  
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3.2.1. Organizational Domain: Military’s Self-Perception of Its Role, 1980-
2001 
 
According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), an organization institutionalizes its 
mission by creating its “formal structure” (1977:347). The formal structure of the 
organization is not only based on the legal document that regulates its status and 
working procedures. Formal structure is the aggregation of the organization‟s legal 
status and its own perception of this status. This approach is simply applicable to 
civil-military relations theory. In the same way, it can be asserted that civil-military 
conflict occurs when two components of formal structure differ significantly from 
each other. The mission of the military is determined under constitutions, laws or 
service codes. Description of military‟s duty, mission and its organizational 
autonomy is legalized within these documents. This is the legal component in the 
formal structure of military. However, Meyer and Rowan (1977: 351) argue that the 
legal component in the formal structure generally holds a minor significance 
comparing to organizational perception of this legal status. Although legal status 
constitutes the basis of the institution‟s role and function, this legal border can 
expand further due to a broader interpretation of its status by the institution. Thus, 
the self-perception of the institution about its role and function becomes a corner 
stone in the formation of its institutional identity. Applying this framework to civil-
military context, it can be asserted that composition of military‟s formal structure 
determines its role in the political system. At this point, there are two important 
aspects that should be considered. First, it is important to analyze which component 
is more dominant in the composition of military‟s formal structure. Is the formal 
structure of military shaped by its legal status or by its self-perception, 
predominantly? Second question that should be taken into account is that what is 
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the degree of deviation of military‟s self-perception from its legal status. To what 
extent the role that military attributes itself reaches beyond the borders determined 
in the legal documents? These two dimensions are elaborated further within 
empirical analysis.  
“Organizational Field” is a similar concept that was suggested by DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) to explain an institution‟s position in the political system. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define this concept as the specific sector determined 
by the organization to create its peculiar practices (1983: 153). Accepted forms of 
practices constitute the borders of institution‟s description of duty. Organizational 
field is determined according to the practices that are internalized by the 
organizations acting in similar fields. In general, military constitutes the monopoly 
in the security sector. Thus, one can assert that the organizational field of military, 
which includes the determination of military‟s role, is determined by military itself 
(Finer 2002: 142). On the other hand, it is also possible to argue that security sector 
is globalized, thus, global security sector is composed of different military 
organizations. As a result of this holistic definition of the security sector, it could be 
asserted that the organizational field in which a specific military acts in is 
determined by the practices, norms and definitions by other military‟s, which are 
members of the global security sector. Since the formation of military has some 
peculiar characteristics related with its geographical location (Colllins 1998), 
regime type (McKinlay and Cohan 1975) and political culture (Farrell 1998), I 
argue that homogenization of forms of practices by different military organizations 
is not completely possible, thus, military has a considerable autonomy in 
determining its organizational field.  
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These two concepts are important to understand the process in which 
military‟s self-construction of its role emerges. Turkish case demonstrates how 
Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) has constructed its self-identification. The role 
perception of TAF in politics can be explained by the construction of its formal 
structure and organizational field.  
Scholars studying on Turkish civil-military relations generally agree that 
TAF has a dominant role in Turkish political system, whose borders reach beyond 
the liberal western model of civil-military settings (Tachau and Heper 1983; Brown 
1989; Hale 1994; Heper and Güney 1996; Narlı 2000). The republican era has been 
intervened by two military coups in 1960 and 1980, and a memorandum in 1971, 
which caused the collapse of the government. Moreover a so-called e-memorandum 
led to the resignation of the government in 1997. The formal structure of the TAF is 
one reflection of this politically active military model. As mentioned above, formal 
structure consists of two components: legal status, and organizational perception of 
this status.  
 
3.2.1.1. Formal Structure: 1980-2001 
 
Major source of TAF‟s legal status in the political system between 1980 and 2001 
is the 1982 Constitution of Turkey. The 1982 Constitution was prepared after a 
military coup in 1980, which overthrown the government and set up a military 
regime which ended with the elections in 1983. The junta established National 
Security Council (NSC)
5
 just after the coup. This council was presided by the Chief 
                                                          
5
 This is not the same institution that is regulated in Article 118 of Turkish Constitution. The 
National Security Council, which still exists as a constitutional organ, will be elaborated later.  
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of General Staff, Kenan Evren, and composed of four other commanders of forces.
6
 
An advisory council is formed by the initiative of this NSC to prepare a new 
constitution. Members of the advisory council was directly assigned by NSC and 
General Evren (Özbudun 1996: 125). Since the 1982 Constitution is prepared by 
the absolute supervision of the organs initiated by the junta regime, this constitution 
is the outcome of a military regime and draws very broad borders for military‟s 
status in the political system. According to Cizre, the constitution attributes a 
tutelary role to the military on Turkish political system (Cizre Sakallıoğlu 1997). 
There are specific articles in the Constitution, which regulate the constitutional 
status of TAF. According to Article 117 of the Constitution, the Supreme 
Commander of Military is the president. However, this duty carries a symbolic 
meaning. The Chief of General Staff does this duty on behalf of the President 
during wartime. The Chief of the General Staff is appointed by the President upon 
the offer of the Council of Ministers.  
The same article renders the Chief of General Staff responsible against the 
Prime Minister. This situation is discussed in the literature in terms of being 
appropriate for having a democratic model of civil-military relations. According to 
Volten and Drent (2008) there is not any single model of practice in Europe in 
terms of institutional position of the chief of general staff (Volten and Drent 2008: 
15). Their empirical research on Germany, France and Romania shows that the 
organizational scheme, which regulates the position of chief of general staff 
towards the civilian government, can vary from case to case in European model of 
civil-military relations. On the other hand, others argue that in the western model of 
civil-military relations, the chief of general staff is subject to the control of the 
                                                          
6
 Names and positions of the commanders: Nurettin Ersin (Commander of Land Forces), Nejat 
Tümer (Commander of Naval Forces), Tahsin ġahinkaya (Commander of Air Forces), Sedat 
Celasun (General Commander of Gendarmerie)  
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Ministry of National Defense (Diamond and Plattner 1996; Cizre 2004). According 
to this group, TAF‟s position is problematic because of its responsibility to the 
Prime Minister but not to Minister of National Defense. This shows that TAF has a 
privileged institutional position in Turkish political system. Besides, since Office of 
the Chief of the General Staff is subordinate to the Prime Ministry, the Chief of 
General Staff‟s position in the state protocol list is at fourth place following the 
Prime Minister, which is above the place of ministers including Minister of 
National Defense
7
.  
The Internal Service Law of Turkish Armed Forces is another legal source, 
which regulates armed forces‟ duty and position. The law was first initiated after 
1960 coup. Article 35 of this law has been in the centre of discussion about Turkish 
civil-military relations. The article entrusts Turkish Armed forces to protect and 
watch over Turkish Homeland and Republic that are defined in the constitution. 
This article is referred by TAF several times as the legal source of its intervention 
in political process. In the announcement of the 1980 coup, General Kenan Evren 
made reference to this article and pointed out that TAF decided to do its duty 
defined in the Internal Service Law and seized the control of government
8
. 
Sarıibrahimoğlu argues that this article gives TAF a political power and source of 
legitimization for its interventions into political process (2006). The article enables 
TAF to protect the country against external threats as well as internal threats. 
However, since the definition of internal threat is controversial, the article gave 
TAF an area in which it can make its own threat conceptualizations. For example, 
                                                          
7
  For more information on state protocol list, please see: 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_b_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=1962&P5=B&pag
e1=61&page2=61 (Last Access: 4.07.2011) 
(Official webpage of Turkish Grand National Assembly) 
8
 Turkish version of the declaration is on http://www.belgenet.com/12eylul/12091980_01.html 
Last (Acess: 4.07.2011) 
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in the declaration of 1980 coup, General Evren stated that “deviant ideological 
opinions” emerged which led to military intervention. In other words, several 
ideological positions were demonized by TAF and perceived as threats against the 
existence of Republic.  
Another problematic point in the TAF‟s legal position between 1980 and 
2001 is about the status and composition of the National Security Council (NSC). 
Roots of this organ dates back to early republican era. In 1933, Supreme Defense 
Council was founded as an institutional organ which was dominated by civilian 
politicians. However, with the coup in 1960, this council was abolished; instead, 
the new constitution in 1961 established a new council under the name of National 
Security Council. The number of the civilians in the council was significantly 
decreased with the new regulation brought by 1961 Constitution. The council is 
reserved after the 1980 coup and placed in the new constitution, which entered into 
force in 1983. According to Article 118 of 1980 Constitution, the Council was 
composed of five civilian and five military members and the president of the 
Council was the Head of State. Since the decisions were made by majority vote, 
with the presidency of Kenan Evren, who was elected as the president in the 
constitutional referendum in 1982, the Council turned into a soldier-dominated 
organ (Zürcher 2004: 176-206). Between 1980 and 2001, article 118 of the 
Constitution stated that the decisions of NSC are taken into government‟s agenda 
with priority. Thus, the NSC became not only an advisory council but also a 
dictating organ over the civilian governments.  
Beside the legal position of Turkish Armed Forces, it is also important how 
TAF perceives its own role. At this point, it is important to further elaborate the 
historical position of the army in Turkish politics. Turkish Armed Forces has 
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always associated its position with its historical role in Turkish politics. According 
to official webpage of the Land Forces, establishment date of Land Forces is given 
as 209 B.C., which is the establishment date of Hun Army by Mete Khan (Modu 
Chanyu).
9
 This shows that TAF intends to establish a correlation between historical 
myth of armed forces and its current position in the politics.  
According to Karabelias (1999), any analysis intending to examine Turkish 
military‟s position in politics would remain shallow without observing its role in 
earlier periods (Karabelias 1999: 131). According to many researchers on Ottoman 
and Turkish history, the army has been one of the most important elements in the 
social, economic and political structure of the Ottoman era. Ottoman societal 
structure composed of two groups. The ruling class was including the Sultan, 
military officers, bureaucratic and religious elite, ulema. This class had the 
monopoly on access to governing mechanisms. Second group was the re’aya that 
composed of ordinary population including both muslim and non-muslims. This 
group had no access to government (Levy 1982). As cited in Karabelias (1999: 
130), Lybyer (1913) stated that “the Ottoman government had been an army before 
it was anything else. In fact army and government were one.” Considering the 
Ottoman political structure, this analogy seems fair to describe the military‟s 
position in Ottoman politics. Military officers were not only soldiers who were 
responsible to serve in military affairs, rather, high ranked officers were also 
appointed as nazır, which were the ministers. These officers were not only 
appointed as “harbiye nazırı” which means minister of war, but they also became 
ministers in other fields. There have been eight maliye nazırı, the minister of 
treasury, from 1891 to 1909 who were serving as officers in the Ottoman Army 
                                                          
9
 http://www.kkk.tsk.tr/GenelKonular/Tarihce/  (Last Access: 4.07.2011) 
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(Pakalın 1944: 48). These officers were not required to retire from the Army when 
they were appointed as members of the cabinet. Thus, the military had a room in 
the politics.  
Role of military in Ottoman system was not only about its active 
involvement in the administrative processes. Much of the researchers on Ottoman 
history agree that the military had a catalyst role in the transformation of the 
Ottoman political system. In the beginning of the 19
th
 century, Ottoman elites 
realized that the state remained considerably inferior compared to continental 
European powers and Britain. The acceptance of Europeans‟ economic, technical, 
military and political superiority triggered several reform initiations. The reforms 
initiated between 1789 and 1807 were named as Nizam-ı Cedid which means new 
order. These reforms were initiated first towards the military restructuration. Sultan 
Selim III formed a new structure within the army and this new model was named 
Nizam-ı Cedid Army. The ultimate goal of this new structuration in the army was to 
catch the European rivals‟ military superiority (Shaw 1965). This army was built to 
create a military capable of being mobilized with the order of its commander who is 
responsible against the Sultan. Strong autonomy of the Janissary Army was seen as 
the source of instability and anti-Sultan coup attempts which reached its peak 
during late 18
th
 century. Hence, Nizam-I Cedid was an army model which was 
responsible and controlled directly by the head of the state, the Sultan, as similar to 
its European counterparts. Following this restructuration in the Army, new officers 
were disciplined to catch the European trends. After the death of Selim III, the 
abolishment of the Janissary Army by Sultan Mahmud II was another important 
step to form a modern army. Mahmud II suppressed the Janissary riot in 1826 with 
a severe violence and following the fights, he declared that Janissary Army is 
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abolished to be replaced by a newly structured modern army (Levy 1971). The new 
army, Muallem Asakir-i Mansure-yi Muhammediye, was more autonomous 
comparing to Selim III‟s Nizam-I Cedid Army. Although it was directly 
subordinate to the Sultan Mahmud II, its internal processes such as promotions of 
the officers and curricula of education were left to high ranked officers. Members 
of the officer corps were sent to several European countries as military attaché. 
Besides, the military schools were organized with a modern structure  similar to 
European military educational institutions (Levy 1971: 27). Thus, it can be asserted 
that the Europeanization and modernization efforts were first initiated in the 
military in Ottoman Empire. In other words, military personnel were the only 
members of ruling class who were educated in institutions that were organized 
similar to its European counterparts. This background of military personnel helped 
to the creation of a cohesive institutional identity. Military elites gradually came to 
believe that military should be the leading and pushing force for the modernization 
efforts.  
Such a self-perception showed its effect on major constitutional changes in 
Ottoman Empire. Military figures were the dominant pushing force during the 
proclamation of the Kanun-i Esâsî of 1876, which is accepted as the first written 
constitution of Ottoman Empire. Midhat Pasha who was claiming that the Ottoman 
state structure should be based on a constitutional framework, was the leader of the 
council that prepared this constitution (Mithat 1973: 71). During the political crisis, 
which was caused by the opposition of Sultan Abdulaziz against the preparation of 
a constitution, Midhat Pasha and the movement gathered around him was so strong 
that were capable to disenthrone two Sultans; Abdulaziz and Murad V (Devereux 
 70 
 
1963). Following the Abdulhamit‟s succeeding to the crown, the constitution was 
imposed on him by Midhat Pasha and the pro-constitution movement around him.  
Military‟s role in the political change has been significant also during the 
republican era. Current Turkish political system is the outcome of a revolution 
which was led by strong military figures. Many scholars agree  that the idea of a 
radical transition from an Islamic empire to a modern republican political system 
did not have a broad ground at the society during the time revolution was initiated 
(Ahmad 1993; Lewis 2002). The leader of the movement, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
was an Ottoman officer before his principal resignation from the military with the 
intention to mobilize a national liberation movement. According to Ahmad, 
republican system in which the sovereignty has given to people but not to 
traditional religious authorities was not familiar with Turkish society during the 
Turkish War of Independence. Rather it was the radical reform plan of a small 
military elite led by Mustafa Kemal (1993: 41). Thus, the formation of modern 
Turkish political system can be accepted as an outcome of a revolution process 
which was initiated, mobilized and finalized by strong military figures.  
Koonings and Kruijt (2002: 19) use the concept of “birthright principle” to 
explain the politicization of a military and define this concept as “… the military 
[is] perceived to have been at the birth of the nation, or that without sacrifices by 
the armed forces the nation would not have been formed or survived. Moreover, it 
is not important whether the myth is historically true.” What matters is that military 
narrates such a foundational myth and places itself in the centre of the nation‟s 
liberation and existence. They argue that Turkey would be the best example of the 
military models which associates its foundational myth with such a liberation 
movement and places itself in the construction of the current Turkish political 
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system. Turkish Armed Forces‟ founding role granted military a wide sphere in 
which military act and became politicized. Turkish political system has been 
classified as a typical regime in which military attributes itself a strong 
guardianship role (Güney 2002: 162-178). Military‟s self-perception regarding to 
its guarding role on the regime has fed from its historical legacy. As cited in Güney 
(2002), Özdağ stated that Atatürk defined military‟s role as “the ultimate guardian 
of the republic” (2002: 163).  
After defining the TAF‟s role based on its historical legacy, its practices 
regarding its self-perception of guardianship can be examined between 1980 and 
2001. TAF has had a politically active character in this period. Military‟s self-
perception of its role has continued to internalize the mission of guardianship. 
Military‟s formal structure has exceeded the borders drawn in the legal documents 
due to the broad self-perception of its role. First, it should be noted that this period 
that I examine starts with a military coup which brought a junta regime that lasted 
for three years. The reasons of the coup can be discussed within a broad context 
which examines internal and external causes; however, it is fair to underline that 
one of the reasons that encouraged military to intervene in democratic process is its 
self-perception of guarding function. The signs of this self positioning are 
observable in the proclamation text of 12 September 1980 coup. On 12 September 
1980, General Evren, the chief of the general staff and the leader of the junta gave 
voice to the proclamation on state radio channel, and reasoned this intervention as 
“…to maintain the national unity, restore the security of life and property by 
preventing anarchy and terrorism… (Brown 1989: 391)” The proclamation made a 
direct reference to the Internal Service Law as the source of the intervention‟s 
legitimacy. It shows that two components of military‟s formal structure consolidate 
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eachother. While the legal definition of military‟s role is referenced as the source of 
legitimacy, this legal status causes the extension of military‟s function which 
enables it to intervene in democratic process. Another reflection of the military‟s 
self-perception of its guarding function is its attitude towards the political activities 
and democratic process. The junta declared that all political activities were stopped 
and political parties were banned. However, it was also stated that the aim of the 
intervention was to eliminate the reasons that prevents democratic system from 
functioning. This message was to imply that the junta‟s plan was not to stay for a 
long time such as happened in Latin American military coups, but to allow political 
process to continue. Military‟s guardianship perception has depicted itself in the 
preparation of the constitution that was presented in 1982 referendum. Regulations 
the on status of NSC decisions and its composition is another evidence of military‟s 
self-perception of its role which is the dominant component in the military‟s formal 
structure. In 1982 constitution, the NSC was formed as an institution in which 
military personnel constitute the majority. Besides, it was stated that the decisions 
of this organ are given priority by the government. According to Güney (2002), the 
structure of the NSC between 1980 to early 2000‟s was one of the cornerstones of 
the tutelary role of the military in Turkish politics.  
The self-perception of TAF has affected also the post-coup period. The 
junta and General Evren intended to shape the post-coup political structure by 
letting only three political parties to enter into elections. Moreover, the parties had 
to get the confirmation of General Evren for each candidate who would compete in 
the election held in 1983 (Birand 1987). I argue that the junta‟s intention was to 
create a party system which is similar to British or American cases. In such a 
model, two or three major parties get the biggest share of the votes whereas small 
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parties remain symbolic political actors and outside of the parliamentary 
representation. Thus, Turgut Özal‟s Mother Land Party (MLP), Turgut Sunalp‟s 
Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP) and Erdal Ġnönü‟s Populist Party (PP) had 
been the three political parties to represent whole political spectrum in Turkey. The 
Mother Land Party and Nationalist Democracy Party were two parties to represent 
the center-right and right tendencies while Populist Party was representing social 
democratic and center-left tendency. According to some, the junta supported 
implicitly Turgut Sunalp‟s NDP, and this party was designed to govern the post-
coup civilian politics. However, the junta was surprised when the election results 
were declared because MDP has got the 23% of the votes while Özal‟s MLP got 
45% and had the right to form a single party government (Waterbury 1992: 131).  
Turkish Armed Forces‟ self-perception of its role has been reinforced by 
two threat conceptualizations: Political Islam and Kurdish separatism. These two 
issues have been the major cruxes of Turkish political agenda especially during the 
period between 1980 and 2001. The Kurdish question of Turkey has been somehow 
kept under control until late 1970‟s. The Kurdish political movement has been 
placed within several leftist movements rather than being organized as specific 
ethnic oriented movements. Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) was established by 
Abdullah Öcalan and his friends in 1978. The movement turned into a paramilitary 
organization with the first attacks to military units in Eruh and ġemdinli in 1984. 
Actors of Turkish politics and military  perceived this movement as a sole security 
problem during middle 1980‟s (Ergil 2000). As Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
illustrates, PKK attacked more on Kurdish civilians in the southeast Turkey rather 
than military targets in 1980‟s. With early 1990‟s it attacked more intensely on 
security forces including police and gendarmerie. Some scholars called this period 
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as a typical ethnic civil war (Kaufmann 1996: 136; Cornell 2001: 31). Intensity of 
the confrontations reached its peak during 1992, 1993 and 1994. The military was 
seen as the major and single method to fight PKK during this period. Military‟s 
conceptualization of security has been the dominant element that affected Turkish 
political agenda. The military‟s self-perception of its guarding role has been 
reinforced both among military personnel and at institutional domain. Thus, it can 
be argued that construction of military‟s perception of its guarding role has been 
directly affected by the Kurdish question which was defined as a security problem 
during this period. In other words, the Kurdish separatism reinforced further the 
self-perception of military about its guardianship function on the territorial integrity 
of the country.  
Secondly, guarding discourse of TAF focused on the secular regime of 
Turkey. Political Islam and “reactionary” movements were defined as one of the 
major threats to Turkey‟s democracy in the National Security Policy Document 
(NSPD) that was prepared in this period (Akay 2009). Akay indicates that the threat 
conceptualizations in this document were directly made by military elites who were 
the dominant in the NSC (2009: 11). The document which was prepared in 1991 
and updated in 1997 was a direct evidence that military perceives its role as the 
guardian against this threat, because the document was saying that military is the 
guarantee of the Turkish Republic in the fight against these internal threats (Akay 
2009: 12).  
Military‟s perception of guardianship showed itself in the form of direct 
intervention to political process in the period between 1980 and 2001. Political 
Islam in Turkey has preferred to take place in center right parties such as 
Democratic Party, Justice Party until the beginning of the 1970‟s. Necmettin 
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Erbakan, who was elected as an independent deputy from Konya in 1969 elections, 
established National Order Party (NOP) in June 1970. Two other deputies joined to 
NOP and the party was represented with three deputies in the parliament until it 
was banned in March 1971 due to “being the focus of the reactionary movements” 
(Kona 2006). Second party of political Islam in Turkey, National Salvation Party 
(NSP) was founded by the same political figures gathered around Necmettin 
Erbakan in 1972. Although NSP did not have any absolute election success, 
throughout the 1970‟s it took parts in three coalition governments (Toprak 1984: 
133). The 1980 military coup banned NSP with all other political parties. The 
movement established a new party, Welfare Party (WP) in 1983 to participate 
upcoming elections. However the junta did not let Necmettin Erbakan and his 
friends enter into elections in 1983 which was the first elections held after 1980 
military coup. WP entered into the parliament in 1991 elections. The local election 
of 1994 was the first serious election success of the political Islam in Turkey. WP 
got the 19% of the votes and became second party after MLP. Besides, it took the 
municipality of two biggest cities, Istanbul and Ankara. Following year, results of 
the general elections depicted the rise in the votes of political Islam .WP got the 
21% of the votes and the majority in the parliament. It alarmed the laicist settings in 
Turkey including the military. Although WP got the majority in the parliament, it 
could not succeed to get the support of other parties to form a coalition government. 
However, in 1996, WP got the support of True Path Party (TPP) and leader of WP, 
Necmettin Erbakan became prime minister. Looking at its historical path, it is clear 
that political Islam became one of the major actors of Turkish politics in last 25 
years which started with election defeats but succeed to get on power.  
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The guardianship perception of military was once more triggered by this 
election success of political Islam. Erbakan‟s prime ministry created an observable 
counter attitude among military elites and it renewed military‟s traditional intention 
to refashion Turkish politics (Cizre and Çınar 2003: 310). The decisions taken in 
the summit of National Security Council (NSC) which was held in 28 February 
1997 started a process which ended with the ban of WP. The President Süleyman 
Demirel chaired the meeting of NSC which was dominated by military staff in that 
time. According to many researchers, the decisions taken in that meeting were 
made by coercion of military. Erbakan‟s resistance10 to sign the declaration of the 
decisions proved that the decisions were targeting WP and the political tendency of 
the movement. Besides, after the summit, WP wanted to soothe the tension and 
stated that the decisions were taken co-operatively within NSC; however, the Office 
of Chief of the General Staff refuted this public release and stated that “Turkish 
Armed Forces works in harmony only with those who internalize the fundamental 
principles of the secular republic founded by Atatürk.” 11  The decisions were 
bringing several regulations in many ordinary areas of life which military cannot be 
even thought to intervene in any western democracy. According to these decisions, 
it was stated that eight year compulsory education is needed; all of the dormitories 
should be controlled by Ministry of National Education, religious personnel should 
be educated in harmony with Atatürkist thought; Supreme Military Council should 
be used effectively to obviate reactionary movements to get into TAF. Within this 
process, the representatives of higher judiciary organs were invited to the Office of 
                                                          
10
 Many of the newspaper in that period has written that the Prime Minister did not want to sign the 
decisions taken in the summit. One of these newspaper headlines can be found at: 
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/zitFJfbkeiqNU5RZSP9LBg_x3D__x3D_ (Last 
Access: 12.06.2011) 
11
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/zitFJfbkeiqNU5RZSP9LBg_x3D__x3D_ (Last 
Access: 12.06.2011) 
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Chief of the General Staff and given briefings about “threat” of reactionary 
movements. The process was not a sole legal tension between the military and the 
civilian authority. Many other actors such as President, civil societal network and 
media were mobilized for an anti-government attitude (Cizre and Çınar 2003: 310). 
Welfare Party was banned due to “being the focus of movements against 
secularism”12 in January 1998 following the trial in the Constitutional Court.   
The process showed that the military have not refrained intervening politics 
and reconfigure the political fragmentation in the country. Military‟s perception of 
its role provided a justification to military when it feels the need to restructure the 
politics. Given that the empirical analysis, two predictions can be made regarding 
the TAF‟s formal structure. First, the dominant component in the military‟s formal 
structure is its self-perception of its role. The legal status, which is the other 
component of the formal structure, has been restored in accordance with the 
military‟s self-perception in the era between 1980 and 2001. Thus, broader self-
interpretation of the role caused expansion of military‟s legal status. Considering 
that the legal status of the civil-military relations in Turkey between 1980 and 2001 
were determined after a coup, it is obvious that military prepared the legal source of 
its strong position within the context of the constitution and specific laws. Second, 
as a result of construction of military‟s legal status in accordance with its 
perception, the deviation between two components has not been dramatic. Rather, 
the legal status of the military has been restored in post-coup era to constitute a 
source of legitimacy for military‟s perception of its position in the political system. 
Thus, the deviation between two components has not been the core of the instability 
of civil-military relations, as the sociological institutionalist theory suggests. 
                                                          
12
 http://www.belgenet.com/dava/rpdava_g01.html (Last Access: 14.06.2011) 
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Instead, preponderancy of the military‟s self-perception in the construction of 
military‟s formal structure resulted in expansion of the sphere of military. Thus, I 
argue that the core of the instability in civil-military relations is not the difference 
between two components of formal structure but one component intends to expand 
other one‟s borders. 
After this discussion, the question is whether a hypothesis can be generated 
from this section. Looking at the discussion of the formal structure of TAF, it is 
possible to assert that military perceives its current role as a continuation of its 
active historical position in Turkish politics. Once the focus is military, traditions, 
history and myths about this institution reinforce the organizational wisdom of the 
institution and cause a broad and rigorous self-perception of its role, which 
becomes problematic in terms of stable and democratic civil-military relations. The 
historical narration can be based on the leading role of the military in a war of 
independence or on being catalyst of modernization. However, presence of a 
historical legacy does not automatically cause a politically active military model in 
the future politics. We may observe many militaries with the claim of historical 
legacy, but not politically active today. For instance, German military, which took a 
prominent role in the German unification and nation-building processes, cannot be 
classified as a political army today. The reason behind this specific case may be the 
absolute defeat of the German army in Second World War. This experience caused 
a deep break off between pre-War and post-War Germany. In other words, the 
paradigm of politics in pre-War Germany was completely different from the period 
following the Second World War. The new paradigm of the politics has been settled 
on the experience of the defeat in Second World War. The political system in which 
Turkish Armed Forces takes its place, on the other hand, is the continuation of the 
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new system, which was established by a movement led by strong military figures. 
Thus, although there have been many significant developments, which affected the 
political process during the era from 1923 to today, the regime is still based on the 
same paradigm, which was imposed by military elites as the new political system of 
the country in 1923. Thus, it can be asserted that this historical experience of 
Turkish military has an increasing effect on the determination of military‟s self-
perception of its role. Based on this assumption, below hypothesis can be 
formulated:  
- A military, which played a prominent role in state/nation-building, modernization 
and social evolution processes might attribute itself a politically active role in the 
post-state/nation-building period. 
 
3.2.1.2. Organizational Field of Turkish Armed Forces: 1980-2001 
 
Organizational field of the Turkish military is considerably broad compared to 
other military organizations in European and western model of civil-military 
relations. Its activities can reach beyond the borders of the military affairs and 
penetrate into civilian spheres of which examples I examine below. In this section, I 
examine the activities of TAF within economic and educational spheres. Empirical 
data presented below show that economic and educational activities of TAF are 
important factors that facilitate construct a strong organizational role of the armed 
forces.  
Most important institutionalized structure of TAF‟s economic activity is 
Armed Forces Pension Fund (AFPF) [OYAK]. AFPF has been a controversial 
institution in terms of its status and activities. It was established in January 1961 by 
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the Law No. 205.
13
 Since it has a specific law which is enforced to determine its 
status and activities, it can be considered as a state institution. However, the 
regulations in the Law No. 205 render it a privileged institution which carries the 
characteristics of a private enterprise while enjoying the facilities of a state 
institution. Article 1 of the law defines its mission to “provide social aid to the 
personnel of Turkish Armed Forces.” While the law makes AFPF depended to the 
Ministry of National Defense, its administrative structure is so complicated that it 
constitutes a problem in terms of the institution‟s status. Administrative structure 
consists of three organs. According to Article 3 of the law, Council of 
Representatives is headed by Minister of National Defense. The members of this 
organ are appointed by Minister of National Defense upon the nomination by the 
commanders and chiefs of the units that provide natural members of AFPF. Since 
most of the units that provide members to AFPF are military institutions, the 
Council of Representatives expectably consists of military personnel 
predominantly. Second administrative organ of AFPF is General Council. General 
Council is composed of forty members of which twenty are among the members of 
Council of Representatives. Seven of the rest twenty members are civilians 
including the Minister of National Defense. Thus, military personnel are also the 
dominant element in the General Council. Last administrative organ is the 
Executive Council. According to Article 8, the Council is composed of seven 
members of which four are civilian members. Although the civilians are the 
majority in the Executive Council, military personnel have a considerable majority 
in the general structure. This puts AFPF into an indecisive position in terms of 
being whether civilian or military based institution. Another point that makes AFPF 
                                                          
13
 Full version of the law can be found at: 
http://content.oyak.com.tr/AFPFdosyalar/media/editor/files/KURUMSAL/AFPF_Kanunu.pdf 
(Official webpage of AFPF) (Last Access: 07.07.2011) 
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controversial lies in the Article 37. According to this Article 1 of Law No. 205, 
AFPF enjoys rights and priorities of other state institutions and assets, although it is 
subjected to the terms of Private Law.  
AFPF has been one of the biggest economic powers in Turkey between 
1980 and 2001 (Demir 2010). By the late 1990‟s, AFPF was the one of three 
biggest economic enterprise. It included more than fifty firms in its structure with 
around 35,000 employees (Demir 2010: 4). Besides, AFPF Bank, which acted in a 
position carrying the characteristics of both public and private banks, was the 
biggest shareholder in the banking sector of Turkey in middle 1990‟s.  
AFPF‟s status is important in the discussion of TAF‟s organizational field 
because AFPF is claimed to constitute the economic division of the project which 
aims to create a strong military structure in Turkey. Demir states that “the presence 
of such a large hybrid military-business holding helps shield the military from 
negative effects of economic downturns while the rest of the society has no such 
safety net (Demir 2010: 5).” As a result, AFPF has been the major project which 
facilitates TAF‟s intention to carry its organizational field into economic sphere.  
Another important area which military perceives as its organizational field 
is education. Military‟s activities in the area of education can be examined under 
two titles: Educational activities of military via “National Security Lesson” in the 
high school curricula; Military‟s internal education. National Security Lesson is 
placed in the curricula of the high school‟s second year. Scope and principles of the 
lesson are regulated under Regulations on National Security Lessons which was 
enforced in February 1980. According to Article 1 of the Regulation, the aim of the 
lesson is “…reinforce the conscious of national security according to requisites of 
total war”, “enlighten the students about their duties on psychological, political, 
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economical and civilian dimensions of modern war” and “introduce armed forces to 
students and form a liaison between them and the military based on love and 
longing.” It shows that TAF intends to extend its organizational field into civilian 
educational area via accommodating military discourse in it. According to Altınay 
(2003), National Security Lesson is an application of military indoctrination within 
the civilian education (2003: 140). Article 7 states that instructors of the lessons are 
appointed by the garrison commander of the closest garrison among officers in 
service. If there are not enough amount officers who can be instructor, it can be 
appointed also among retired officers. The officer who is the instructor is required 
to go to lessons wearing his military uniform. The lessons can also be given 
primary and secondary schools in the status of elective courses. Article 5 states that, 
if the lesson is in primary school curricula, military marching styles, military 
anthems, and games which promote the feeling of soldiership can be placed. The 
context and implementation of National Security Lesson can be claimed that they 
are designed to construct military‟s role in the perceptions of the society‟s legally 
junior members, which will be further elaborated in following section that 
scrutinizes societal perception of military‟s role. Yet, the military‟s existence in 
such an area, which is supposed to be solely civilian, shows that expansion of the 
military‟s organizational field by going beyond the military area holds an important 
place in the military‟s self-role construction process.   
Military‟s internal education is also worth examining to discover the borders 
of military‟s organizational field. Uyar and Varoglu (2008) focuses on the curricula 
of Turkish Military Academy in its historical context. Their study shows that the 
curricula of the Military Academy can be examined in two periods. In early 
republican period, the curricula of the academy were kept very limited. According 
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to Uyar and Varoglu, in this period, a conservative approach was ascendant in the 
designation of the curricula (2008: 192). This approach saw no need to give 
education to the officers in any area other than military issues. According to this 
approach, the aim of the military academy was war readiness of the military 
personnel. Even, “World History” and “Modern Turkish History” courses were 
added to the curricula as late as 1947 (2008: 191). Besides, in this period, several 
technical lessons were added to provide some basic information which is useful to 
learn the functioning of specific war material. With middle 1970‟s, several reforms 
have been initiated in the officer training system. In this second period, the 
reformist approach defended that scope of education in the military academy, which 
tends to discipline the officers only in military area remains shallow. It was in 
contradiction with the pioneering mission of the military in Turkish modernization 
(2008: 192). In this period, the aim was to train “multi-faceted and real intellectual” 
officers. As a result of this approach, several new departments, such as Economics 
have been established within the academy and lessons such as Behavioral Sciences 
were added to the curricula. However, with 1980 military coup, conservative 
approach became dominant again. The raise of conservative approach caused 
closure of several departments. In the era between 1980 and 2001, the curricula and 
the structure of the academy did not remain same as early 1980‟s. The end of the 
Cold War and the change of the paradigm forced military review its attitude 
towards officer training. In 1990‟s, military academy wanted to open to civilian 
area in accordance with the aim of training intellectual soldiers who were capable 
of make academic debates in civilian area. Master‟s degree programs were 
established within Staff College. Besides, many military personnel were sent to the 
United States and Europe for postgraduate studies. In this period, Turkish military 
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was the leader in the number of the officers sent to U.S. Naval Post Graduate 
School comparing to other countries‟ military personnel (Uyar and Varoglu 2008: 
195). To sum up, the military‟s internal education has been subject to changes. The 
intention of being more active in civilian sphere showed its effect in the designation 
of Turkish Military Academy‟s curricula. Especially with the demise of Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War, military‟s initiation to make opening to civilian 
sphere was more visible and observable in the curricula.  
In sum, economy and education constitute important place in the 
determination of the military‟s organizational field. TAF has had a considerable 
autonomy in the determination of its organizational field‟s borders. The broader 
interpretation of military‟s role shows its effect in the organizational field, which 
penetrates into civilian spheres such as economic enterprises and civilian education. 
Can this observation be formulated in the form of a hypothesis? The military‟s 
activities within economic and education spheres require military to interact with 
civilians. According to Janowitz‟s argument that is mentioned in the Literature 
Review Chapter, the existential difference between military and civilian worlds gets 
narrower, as the military interact more intensely with civilians. Janowitz argues that 
diminishing of the gap between these two worlds would provide an appropriate 
ground for a democratically controlled military model. However, in the Turkish 
case, we see that military‟s activities in civilian areas provide ground for a stronger 
military presence within society. In other terms, military‟s economic and 
educational activities are used as instruments to reinforce military‟s position in the 
society, and they appeared as the reflections of a strong military. Based on this 
observation, following argument can be made:  
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- A military with a strong self-perception of its role might use several civilian sectors 
to reinforce its position within the political system.  
Several theoretical implications can be derived from this section. The 
empirical research on Turkish military‟s self-perception of its role presented in 
3.2.1 prove that one important domain of analysis in the study of military‟s role is 
the organizational domain. In this domain, the military‟s self-perception of its role 
is constructed with the contribution of several social inputs. Two concepts, which 
are used to explain this process, are formal structure and organizational field. 
Derived from the observations, TAF perceived its role as the continuation of the 
historical Turkish military figure, which took active roles in the state/nation-
building and modernization processes. Since it locates itself in the center of the 
nation‟s existence under a liberated state, and modernization process, its self-
perception has been based on a “guarding” function in Turkish political regime. 
Thus, it can be asserted that elaborating the historical position of an army might 
shed lights to the current role of this military. Not only politically active militaries 
but also different military models can be understood and analyzed better by 
observing historical roots. Specifically, TAF‟s self-perception of its role enhanced 
the legal borders of its activities, which has caused a problematic civil-military 
relations model in the era between 1980 and 2001. Such a broad self-perception of 
the military has also been effective in the expansion of the organizational field of 
TAF. In Turkish case, it shows that broader self-perception results in expansion of 
the sectors in which military act, while this expansion provides more power to 
military in the political system.  
3.2.2. Societal Domain: 1980-2001 
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Any intervention of military into civilian sphere needs justification. The legal 
documents that are the source of legitimacy for the intervention constitute the legal 
component of the justification. However, legal sphere is just one part of the 
justification that is needed for a stable setting in post-intervention era. Thus, any 
military regime seeks ground for its intervention not only at legal sphere but also in 
the perception of society. Expectably, any military wants to face with minimum 
societal resistance to its intervention. Military interventions lacking societal support 
suffer generally from instability and put more effort to accommodate the political 
setting that is intended to be established via the intervention. For example, the regime 
in Burma
14
 is a typical case of military regimes that lacks public support (Fink 2001). 
In the case of Burma, military regime faced with public resistance many times, which 
resulted in severe violence. As the duration of Burmese military regime approaches 
to a half century, the estimated number of deaths in the resistance movements of 
Burmese people against military regime is above 35,000 (Fink 2001: 29). Thus, 
military that intend to shape political process seeks societal justification to its 
military intervention (Sundhaussen 2002: 331).  
In the case of Turkey, societal perception of military constitutes a major 
source of power to military. Sarigil (2009) examines the public opinion on 
confidence to military. According to the data he includes in his research, TAF 
enjoys a high degree of public confidence. He argues that this popularity reinforces 
military‟s position once it intends to find a source of legitimization for its 
intervention in political sphere (2009: 711). Similarly, Atlı (2010) claims that major 
source of TAF‟s capability to legitimize its intervention comes from the social 
confidence attributed to TAF. Demirel also makes a similar point stating that “a 
                                                          
14
 The official name of the country is changed as Republic of the Union of Myanmar by the 
junta on power.  
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lack of negative evaluation of military rule led civilians and soldiers alike to 
consider military coup as a viable option (2005: 264).”  
While examining the Turkish case, the societal perception is not only 
important to analyze how TAF‟s interventions have been justified by the perception 
of the society but it is also crucial to understand the strong position of the military 
in Turkish political system. Turkish Armed Forces was one of the major actors in 
the political sphere between 1980 and 2001. This active position of military in the 
political system has been directly correlated with the accordingly constructed 
societal perception of military. The guardianship function of military has been 
normalized widely in the society. Besides, TAF has been the most credible 
institution among the society (Sarigil 2009: 710). In the construction process of 
military‟s role at societal domain, militarist discourse has been dominant in society 
as well as in political area. In this section, I examine this construction process by 
elaborating different instruments that are used to shape the societal perception of 
military‟s role. I focus on political sphere and citizenry separately as the 
components of civilian segment. In the political sphere, I observe that militarist 
discourse has found itself a broad ground in the politics via the nationalist ideology. 
On the other hand, I examine three instruments which have effect on citizenry‟s 
perception of military‟s role: conscription system, education and the media.  
 
 
3.2.2.1. Political Sphere: 1980-2001 
 
I have focused on the foundational myth of the Turkish Armed Forces in 3.2.1.1., 
which places TAF in the center of the nation‟s existence and foundation of the 
current republican system. I argued that existence of such a foundational myth 
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granted military wider defined self-perception of its role. However, Altınay and 
Bora (2001: 140) points out that: “Foundation of Republic of Turkey following a 
war is not unique, as contrary to it is often thought to be so. Militaries and wars 
played a founding role for almost all nation-states‟ foundation. However, the 
position of the military after the state was established has been different in each of 
these nation-states.” 
Hence, strong position of TAF in the Turkish political system cannot be 
explained only with military‟s self-perception. Societal construction of TAF‟s role 
is another important domain of analysis that can enlighten the general construction 
process.  
Analyses that are made in the CMR literature generally take the civilian part 
only as the political institutions. Although, I agree that politics is supposed to be the 
affair of civilians, it should be noted that political sphere does not represent the 
whole concept of civilian, but it is an integral part of civilian sphere. Thus, this 
section attributes a specific importance to political domain, as one component of 
civilian sphere.  
To understand the strength of military discourse in the Turkish politics, it is 
important to elaborate the liaison between Turkish nationalism and militarism. 
Nationalism has been an ideology which is agreed on to some extent by almost all 
major political parties in Turkish politics (Kadioglu 1996). It is possible to examine 
Turkish party system between 1980 and 2001 under three segments. First, center-
right political parties, such as True Path Party and Mother Land Party internalized 
the nationalist identity as a component of their institutional identity, which is 
composed of classical conservative elements of center-right political approach. 
Secondly, Nationalist Action Party (NAP) claimed that it has been the true address 
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of nationalist political movement during this period. Thirdly, social democratic 
political parties, such as Social Democratic Populist Party (SDP) and Republican 
People Party (RPP) were significantly affected by Kemalist doctrine, which is 
based on a unionist approach to Turkish nationalism. Thus, nationalism has been a 
privileged ideology which constitutes the core of many political movements in 
Turkish politics in this period. Nationalism has had also a legal status which 
constitutes the source of its privileged position in Turkish politics. Law of Political 
Parties, which entered into force in April 1983, states that “political parties work as 
depended to Atatürk‟s principles…”15 Considering that nationalism is one of six 
principles of Atatürk, the law states indirectly that political parties cannot act 
against the nationalist ideology.  
There has been a strong connection between Turkish nationalism and 
militarist discourse. Militarism can be defined, as cited in Altınay (2004), as the 
over-glorification of military concepts, practices and norms in the civilian areas 
(Chenoy 1998: 101). In other words, in a militarist environment, actors of the 
civilian sphere would think, plan and act in accordance with the militarily defined 
concepts. Most visible characteristic of Turkish nationalist ideology has been 
dominated by a strong militarist jargon. Turkish nationalist discourse has been 
based on epic narratives of Turkish soldiership. It should be noted that Turkish 
nationalism cannot be defined under a single political movement. Turkish 
nationalists have been organized and have taken part in different political parties, 
such as in center-right parties, in NAP and even in parties that describe itself as 
social democratic. However, the myth of military has been an integral and vital part 
of the discourse of these different nationalist movements. Charismatic leader of 
                                                          
15
 Article 4 of Law of Political Parties, Law No: 18027 (24.04.1983) For full version of the 
Law, please see: http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/2820sk.htm (Last Access: 01.07.2011) 
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Ülkücü movement, Alparslan TürkeĢ was a military officer, who took part in 1960 
military coup. Militarist jargon had an important place in the discourse of the 
Ülkücü movement and Nationalist Action Party. Reha Oğuz Türkkan, who is one of 
the leading figures of Pan-Turkist nationalism
16, stated that “if war is the necessity 
of the modern world, Turks should be the masters of this world because; Turks 
were born to be soldiers. Thus, Turks should fight. Turks will exist by fighting 
(Önen 2001: 362).” Finally, Republican People Party, which represents the left 
wing discourse of nationalism, has been criticized to develop a discourse based on 
military bureaucracy and militarist jargon (Dağı 2008). In sum, Turkish nationalism 
has significantly been influenced by militarist discourse.  
On the other hand, construction of TAF‟s role at political domain has not 
only been via usage of militarist discourse in nationalist ideology. Turkish Armed 
Forces have been the place where Turkish nationalist discourse has been produced 
and shaped. Kemalism defines nationalism based on citizenship. Kemalists claim 
that Turkish nationalist ideology has not been bound by race but it makes reference 
to an egalitarian citizenship (Deringil 1993: 166). However, several internal 
practices of TAF depict that nationalist discourse has been reproduced sometimes 
based on ethnicity and religion. As a typical example of this reproduction a non-
Muslim citizen of Turkey has not ever been officer in any domain in Turkish 
Armed Forces (Altınay and Bora 2001: 148). In the era between 1980 and 2001, we 
see that militarist reproduction of nationalist discourse by TAF has influenced 
political sphere. Researchers on National Security Policy Document (NSPD) claim 
                                                          
16
 Many researchers on Turkish nationalism agree on that Türkkan‟s ideology is based on Turkish 
racism. Although Türkkan rejected that his approach to nationalism is based on racism, his definition 
of nation in the base of blood and race shows that he was significantly impressed by the racist 
ideology. For more information on Türkkan‟s ideas please see Önen, N. (2001). Reha Oğuz Türkkan. 
Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi DüĢünce: Milliyetçilik. T. Bora. Ġstanbul, ĠletiĢim. 
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that
17
, in the NSPD which was revised in 1993, activities of non-Muslim minorities 
were ranked third in the list of threats against national security following threats of 
terrorism and political Islam (Karakas 2010)
18
. Considering that NSC, which is the 
institution that prepares NSDP, was dominated by officers in until 2001, military‟s 
own interpretation of nationalist discourse has not only remain in internal practices 
of military, but also shaped the political agenda of Turkey.  
As touched upon above, Turkish nationalism cannot be classified under 
single political movement. Nationalist discourse found itself place in many political 
movements from right to left wings of the political spectrum. However, the military 
reshaped the Turkish politics as representing the “true nationalism (Bora 2001: 
691)” in this period. The junta banned Nationalist Action Party following the 
proclamation of the coup. The leader of the party, TürkeĢ was arrested and banned 
from politics for almost a decade. Besides, many members of the Ülkücü movement 
were arrested as well (Arikan 1998: 125). In other words, the nationalist movement 
was included in the “deviant ideologies”, which were underlined in the 
proclamation of the coup. Thus, military has not only been the institution which 
internalized nationalist ideology, it has reproduced the “legitimate” Turkish 
nationalism and determined the borders of the political discourse engaged with 
nationalism.  
Spread ground nationalism in Turkish political life, and its strong 
relationship with militarist jargon granted military a room in Turkish society. 
Political parties and political elites have been influenced by nationalist discourse in 
                                                          
17
 According to official web page of NSC, National Security Policy Document (NSPD) is a top secret 
document. However, after each revision of the document, debates and news about the documents take 
place in media. Researchers on NSPD generally make comment as based on these debates in the 
media. 
18
 http://www.stargazete.com/yazar/eser-karakas/milli-guvenlik-siyaset-belgesi-haber-273547.htm 
(Last Access: 6.07.2011) 
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which militarist concepts hold a vital place. Political sphere has been dominated by 
the terms that have been developed under the influence of militarist jargon. Thus, 
strength of nationalism in Turkish politics enabled military to express itself within 
political sphere. In other terms, nationalist ideology has been a door for military 
that is opening to political segment of the society.  
 
3.2.2.2. Citizenry: 1980-2001 
 
Citizenry is the second component of civilian segment that I focus. As touched 
upon before, building on Schiff (1995), I believe that citizenry should be analyzed 
separately from political sphere. This is not to say that politics does not belong to 
civilian sphere. I agree that politics should remain civilian. However, the 
instruments used in the military‟s role construction can differentiate in politics and 
citizenry. Thus, I believe separate analysis of politics and citizenry is healthier. 
Below, I examine the instruments that are used in the construction of citizenry‟s 
perception of military‟s role. The instruments that I examine are compulsory 
military service system, education and media.   
Compulsory conscription has been the most important instrument that is 
used by military to shape the society‟s perception of military‟s function in politics 
(Altınay 2004: 87-89). To understand the influence of the compulsory conscription 
on the societal perception, a brief review on the literature is needed. Compulsory 
military service is a phenomenon that is applied as a result of the emergence of 
nation-state (Sasson-Levy 2005). Before this structural change in the state model, 
armies of European empires were based on legionnaires, who were paid soldiers. 
France has been the first nation-state that built an army based on compulsory 
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conscription. According to Eugen Weber (1976), conscription played an important 
role to create “French” nation (As cited in Altınay and Bora 2001: 140). According 
to Janowitz (1976: 357), modern definition of citizenship has been based on 
“participation in armed conflicts” after the creation of compulsory conscription 
system. In this sense, compulsory military service has been an integral part in 
nation-state‟s project of citizen creation.  
A brief review on the countries that apply compulsory military service 
shows that there is a strong relationship between compulsory conscription system 
and strength of the militarist discourse in that society (Kestnbaum 2000). 
According to Horowitz and Kimmerling (1974), strength of the militarist discourse 
in Israeli politics is a natural result of the strict implementation of compulsory 
military service. It is noteworthy that Israel is a country where compulsory system 
is not only required for male but also for women. Best example of the relationship 
between military service and citizenship in Israel is that Israeli state has the right to 
execute the deprivation of citizenship for those who escape from military service 
(Levy 2003). Another example of the militarized societies as a result of strict 
military conscription can be Caucasus countries. According to Faber and Kaldor 
(2006), one of the most important reasons of militarized political sphere in several 
Caucasus countries, such as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, is that they did not 
abolish the strict conscription policy which is applied during the Soviet era. Since 
Caucasus is a region where there are newly established nation-states, the 
conjuncture is very suitable for an instable environment in the region. However, 
strength of the militarist discourse in the region results in deadlocks in the 
negotiations for the solution of the conflicts among countries in the region. In this 
sense, Faber and Kaldor underline that military service system is the most 
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important instrument in the construction of this strong militarist societal perception 
in the Caucasus countries (p. 149). On the other hand, according to Roghmann and 
Sodeur (1972), the decrease of the militarist discourse in Germany in post-World 
War II era is directly related with the new regulations enforced in middle 1960‟s 
that softened the conscription system. In these new regulations, Germany 
recognized the right to prefer to serve in public institutions instead of being 
conscripted. In sum, compulsory military service system is an important instrument 
for military to adopt its discourse in the societal domain.  
In Turkish context, compulsory military service system has been an 
important instrument in the construction of military‟s role at societal domain. 
Compulsory conscription was first initiated in 1927 with several amendments in the 
1924 Constitution (Jenkins 2007: 341). Looking at the newly appearing nation-
states of that era, it is possible to underline that compulsory military service system 
was a general method that is applied by many nation-states. However, in Turkey, 
military service was not only a conscription system that was required by the 
necessities of time, but it also helped the mythicising of military‟s historical role. 
According to Jenkins (2007), introduction of the compulsory military service 
system strengthened the discourse that is based on the identification between nation 
and army (p. 341). In this sense, Altınay emphasizes that the creation of “myth of 
military-nation” was not only providing military a limitless human source, but also  
created an approach toward military service as a historical reality of Turkish 
identity. Adopted daughter of Mustafa Kemal, Afet Inan‟s (1969) emphasis of 
military service is an important example of this approach toward military service 
(borrowing from Altınay 2004: 29):  
“Military training can be given in a matter of years, whereas military spirit is an 
ore that is born from the hammering of the abilities and capabilities of humankind 
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throughout the centuries on the anvils of experience and transformation into steel in 
the fire of life that has been fanned with raging storms. That is why the Turkish 
nation is the nation with most developed military spirit… A nation with high 
military spirit is a nation with history of civilizations.”    
 
Thus, it can be asserted that military service in Turkey was not only applied 
as the necessity of the conjuncture but also presented as the most important 
characteristic and historical reality of Turkishness. Another noteworthy meaning of 
the military service in Turkey is that it is an integral part in the construction of male 
identity and masculinity. Serving in the military is perceived not only as a duty of 
citizenship, but also as a necessity of being a “real man”  (Sinclair-Webb 2000: 72).  
In the era between 1980 and 2001, presence of the strong meaning of 
military service affected social life of the citizens. Firstly, it is possible to claim that 
duration of the military service in this period has been long compared to other 
countries applying compulsory conscription. According to the table given in the 
webpage of Ministry of National Defense
19
, the duration of military service in this 
era had a decreasing tendency comparing to 1970‟s. In 1970‟s the duration of the 
conscription was 20 months including 30 days of vacation leave. Effective from 
March 1985, different durations for university graduates have been introduced. 
According to this amendment, university graduates served for 15 months while 
conscripts with lower degrees served 18 months. In 1990‟s decreasing tendency of 
the durations continued. In 1992, the duration was lowered to 15/8 months by 
continuing the implementation of different conditions for university graduates. 
However, due to the rise in terrorism in 1993, the military declared that all 
discharges are stopped for four months, and extended the scope of suspension for 
further three months in 1994. Following this development, 18 month conscription 
system was reintroduced in January 1995.  
                                                          
19
 http://www.asal.msb.gov.tr/er_islemleri/gun.kadar%20askerlik%20hiz.htm (Official 
Webpage of the Ministry of National Defense) (Last Access: 5.07.2011) 
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Long duration of the military service in Turkey turned into an element of 
social pressure. With the rise of militarist discourse in middle 1990‟s due to 
terrorism, military service became some kind of prerequisite for individuals to take 
part in social life. Compliance of military service has been a precondition for many 
firms seeking new employees. Besides, “many families –and women themselves- 
would not favour marriage until the prospective husband completed his service 
(Sinclair-Webb 2000: 74).” On the other hand, in this period, many people were 
punished to deprivation of citizenship due to escaping from military service.  
To sum up, it is obvious that military service has been perceived as an 
important aspect of Turkish citizenship, male identity in the country and shaped the 
societal perception of TAF. At this point, I would like to make a brief discourse 
analysis of the slogans, mottos and anthems that are sang by soldiers to see how 
inner practices of military service indoctrinates the conscripts with the militarist 
discourse. I believe these practices are important, because these symbols constitute 
an integral part in the identity of individuals (Cerulo 1993). I should note that these 
slogans and anthems are not official; hence they are not under record of any 
academic sources. Rather, I collected these data by interviewing with officers 
serving in the military and with people who were conscripted especially in early 
and middle 1990‟s. Another point that I would like to note is about the translation 
of these slogans and anthems. I translated these pieces by myself. I recognize that 
literary translation is a specific field that requires expertise. However, I sought to 
express the epic meanings of several concepts included in these anthems and 
slogans. Hence, I preferred to stick to the original manuscripts during translation.  
I would like to start with a very general slogan, which turned almost into an 
aphorism:  
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“Every Turk is born a soldier.” (Her Türk asker doğar.) 
This slogan is shouted rhythmically by conscripts especially during the 
running. It perfectly reflects the understanding that Altınay (2004) names “myth of 
military nation”. Obviously, it makes reference to historical meaning of military 
and identifies nation with soldiership.   
Another very popular slogan is as follows: 
“Martyrs are immortal, our land is indivisible.” (Şehitler ölmez, vatan 
bölünmez.) 
This slogan is so popular that it can be heard from civilians marching in a 
funeral of a soldier. According to me, it depicts the understanding that normalizes 
death for country, which is a typical assumption of militarist discourse. At this 
point, I would like to touch upon the meaning of a word: vatan. This word can be 
translated into English as homeland, soil or country. However, I believe that this 
word includes a specific epic meaning that differs from standard meaning of 
homeland. Expression of this word in Turkish context indicates an emotionally over 
glorified meaning. Thus, I argue that this slogan follows the Atatürk‟s approach to 
vatan: “If the matter is vatan, the rest is inessential.” (Söz konusu vatansa, gerisi 
teferruattır.)  
We can observe the same understanding, which trivializes the life 
comparing to vatan, in another slogan with: 
“My life to sacrifice for vatan” (Vatan sana canım feda.)  
I collected lyrics of several anthems sang by conscripts by interviewing both 
military officers including those in active duty, and also regular soldiers who were 
conscripted for their compulsory military service. Some of my interviewees 
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requested to keep their name anonymous while some others do not have any 
problem with publishing their names.  
My first interview was with a professional sergeant (uzman çavuş) whose 
family live in Ankara although he still serves in Malatya. He underlines that these 
songs and anthems are very helpful to keep the motivation of soldiers alive, 
especially in the risky regions such as southeast Turkey. Malatya is the sixth city 
where he was appointed, while four of former cities that he served in were in 
southeast Turkey. I noted one “Commando Oath” and one song that are sang by 
soldiers that he trained when he was in Tunceli.  
A part of commando oath is as follows:  
 “…I am Turkish Commando,  
 I defeat the enemy with my steel pounce.  
 I am everywhere. On air, in land, in sea, in deserts, 
 In mud and in quag. 
 Everywhere and every time, 
 In Siirt, in Hakkari, in Tunceli, 
 In Gökçeada, in Bolu. 
 I am ready all the time…” 
In this so-called oath, we can observe the aim that my interviewee 
underlined: keeping the motivations of soldiers alive. Especially first two lines can 
be taken as the expression of the self-confidence. A more interesting point is the 
cities that are included in the lyrics. Siirt, Hakkari and Tunceli are the cities of 
which population is dominated by Kurdish citizens of Turkey, while Gökçeada is 
an island where members of Greek minority live. Thus, it triggers me to ask 
whether there is a specific message for inhabitants of these cities, and my 
interviewee answers this question politically: “There is no need to speculate on 
this.” At this point, he feels the necessity to repeat that these anthems are not 
officially included in any documents, but they are just practices that can 
 99 
 
differentiate in various regions. He adds that this oath is taught to soldiers in first 
45 day period of their service to adapt them the spirit of soldiership.  
The song that I noted from this interview uses a very aggressive language: 
    
   “My stouthearted, do not relent for those dogs, 
  Remember, how they massacred your sister, 
  Time for death is getting closer. 
  Fire the bullet to ratty brains,  
  Let Gabar burn, and bring Cudi down.” 
 
Apart from the aggressive language of the lyrics, it is noteworthy that Gabar 
and Cudi are two mountains where armed conflicts between PKK militants and 
armed forces appear very often.  
In another interview with a person who completed his military service first 
in Burdur then in Tunceli, I noted a poem that is shouted rhythmically by soldiers 
during their morning sport. 
  “Commando, do not forget that you owe this vatan, 
  The border and the sanjak are your rectitude. 
  Commando, make the mountains unbearable,  
To communists, secessionists and jackals.” 
In this piece, we observe the “deviant ideologies”, which were referred in 
the proclamation of 1980 coup by General Kenan Evren. It is interesting that 
communism is included in this poem as a demonized ideology, as well as 
secessionism.  
Finally, I would like to include a song that I noted in an interview with a 
person who served in Cyprus, Girne in 1998. He noted that after the sergeant taught 
this song to soldiers, he was reprehended by his officer who heard soldiers singing 
this song. However, my interviewee adds that they kept singing this song altogether 
several other times.  
 “He holds his grenade in one hand, and flask in other, 
 We entered into Athens, 
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  Our Mehter Anthem is heard from Athens, 
 We hold our head straight against the Greek.” 
Considering the place where he completed his military service, the 
aggressive language of the song against Greeks is meaningful. It is also helpful to 
understand how militarized discourse perceives the neighbor, who represents a 
figure of historical threat (Brauer 2002). 
To sum up, I argue that there is a strong relationship between a strong 
military figure in politics and the compulsory conscription system in Turkey. In that 
sense, compulsory military service system is an important instrument for spreading 
the militarist discourse among society. Compulsory system provides military the 
opportunity to train at least the half of the society, while other half is also affected 
by the militarist discourse. 
I made a brief introduction to the military‟s interest in education in the 
section where I analyzed the organizational field of military. In this part, I focus on 
military and militarist discourse in the Turkish education system in a more general 
context.  
Education has been another important instrument in the construction of 
militarist discourse in societal sphere. According to Altınay (2009), the education in 
Turkey is not only affected by military, but it is a wholly “militarized” area (p. 
143). First, National Security lessons should be focused on to understand militarist 
discourse in Turkish education system. As touched upon in while elaborating 
organizational field of TAF, National Security lesson is typical implementation of 
military training in civilian education. The teachers of the lesson can be officers 
both in active duty and retired. Legal regulation on the lesson rules that the 
instructor should wear his uniform during the course. As a student who took this 
course during my high school education, I can argue that the relationship between 
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students and the instructor is the same as the relationship between soldier and his 
officer. The course starts with a typical salutation ceremony. The students who 
want to get the floor for a word request the permit of the instructor and introduce 
themselves and speak standing up. Altınay underlines that the course were designed 
to prepare students to military service in the beginning, however, the scope of the 
course reached beyond this aim especially after 1980 coup. After the coup, the 
syllabus of the course intended to raise a youth who adopted the principles of 
Atatürk and make them aware of the threats the country faces (2009: 142). At this 
point, threat conceptualization of the course is important. As Altınay‟s research on 
the course‟s syllabus shows, almost all neighbors of Turkey are perceived as 
sources of threat against Turkey in the context of the course. Iran intends to export 
its political regime which is based on religion; Armenia aims to establish “Greater 
Armenia” including eastern Turkey; Syria‟s plans on Hatay are still valid; and 
“Megali Idea” is the primary goal of Greece to reestablish a greater Greece in the 
Aegean Region (p. 143). In this sense, it is a course in which current political issues 
are discussed. According to Altınay, the message of this is the emphasis that the 
politics should be approached with a military attitude (p. 143). 
Militarist discourse‟s engagement with education is not limited to National 
Security lesson. In a more general context, we can observe the militarist discourse 
in Turkish education system in this era. The title of Altınay‟s another study (2009) 
on militarist discourse in Turkish education system is a typical example of the 
strength of the militarist discourse in education: “I die, I shed blood.” (Can veririm, 
kan dökerim.) This is a song that is taught to secondary school students in the 
context of Music lessons, and it continues with “I cannot relinquish from this 
right.” Thus, violence in the name of vatan is not only presented as a duty but also a 
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right. Besides, the emphasis on sensitive geopolitics of Turkey can be observed in 
the textbooks of two other courses apart from National Security lesson: 
“Geography” and “Citizenship”. In this context, it is emphasized that Turkey faces 
several threats because of its strategic location and it needs a strong military power.  
Altınay identifies three points in textbooks that are in contradiction with 
human rights (2009: 145-160). Firstly, she underlines that Turkish education 
system glorifies the myth of military-nation. Thus, education can be taken as the 
process in which Turkish society is indoctrinated with preliminary militarist 
discourse. Secondly, general discourse in the education normalizes the violence and 
death in the name of concepts such as vatan and flag. Finally, the citizen model that 
the education system in Turkey intends to raise is a militarized figure.  
Finally, I focus on the construction of military‟s role in media, which is 
another component of civilian sphere. I specifically examined the general discourse 
of mainstream media just after the 1980 coup, to see how 1980 coup was perceived 
in the media.  
Building on my brief archival research in the National Library in Ankara, I 
can argue that mainstream media‟s attitude towards 1980 coup was generally in a 
supportive tone. In my research, I have skimmed many columns in newspapers such 
as Hürriyet, Milliyet, Tercüman and Cumhuriyet. In this section, I aim to analyze 
some of these columns. 
Oktay Akbal‟s article in 13 September 1980 was a kind of salutation of the 
“12 September 1980 Operation.” He was saying that “… supporters of Atatürk‟s 
principles, the Military could not ignore the recent situation.” “… they invited the 
politicians to the path of Atatürk, as they did in 1960 (Akbal 13.09.1980).” Cüneyt 
Arcayürek was stating that operation aims to achieve the ideal of democratic and 
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laic Turkey (Arcayürek 14.09.1980). In my research in Milliyet‟s archive, which is 
available online, I found Özdenoğlu‟s article which I believe reflecting the general 
attitude of Milliyet toward 1980 coup. Lawyer ġinasi Özdenoğlu‟s named the coup 
as a “bloodless revolution.” He stated that:  
 “… 12 September Operation is internalized in the whole country. If there 
was a referendum, Turkish society would prefer this way for salvation… From this 
moment on, only and common aim should be to provide the appropriate conditions 
for operation to achieve its goals… Everybody should know that 12 September is 
synonymous with existence for Turkish nation (Özdenoğlu 01.10.1980).”  
Özdenoğlu also stated that “the operation should not deviate from its goal, 
because this operation can only achieve its goal by taking the support of society.” 
Thus, the importance of societal perception of military‟s role can be observed once 
again in the article of Özdenoğlu. Another famous columnist, Güneri Cıvaoğlu was 
claiming that “steps taken by the 12 September movement show that we should not 
identify the operation with other military regimes in world (Cıvaoğlu 04.10.1980).” 
Finally, I found the leading article of Milliyet, which was written by 
Mehmet Barlas, that was published in 14.11.1983. Barlas underlined that transition 
to democracy and preparing of new constitution that was presented to referendum 
showed that those who made 12 September operation kept their promise. Besides, 
he expressed his confidence to Kenan Evren‟s statement that he is loyal to 
democracy (Barlas 14.11.1983).  
As the brief archival research shows, media is another civilian sphere in 
which military‟s guardianship role is constructed. Thus, it should be noted as one of 
the areas that shape society‟s perception of military. 
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Based on the observations presented in this section, several arguments can 
be generated. First of all, it is showed that there is a connection between the power 
of the nationalism in the society and ground for the expression of militarist 
discourse in societal domain. In the Turkish case, we see a strong militarist 
discourse embedded within Turkish nationalism. This may not be generalizable for 
all nationalisms. However, in general, militaries hold a significant place within 
nationalist discourses (Posen 1993: 83). Still, I believe Turkish nationalism 
includes specific constructional roots which facilitate disperse of militarist 
discourse among societal segments. Thus, to generalize this situation may lead 
flawed arguments, which cannot explain other cases, in which nationalist ideology 
is strong but militarist discourse is not. Yet, in the case of Turkey, we see that 
strength of the nationalist ideology provided an important ideological instrument to 
construct societal perceptions in the manner that favoring a strong military model.  
Secondly, it is obvious that compulsory conscription system provides a huge 
human resource to military to express its discourse to wider segments of the 
society. As touched upon above, scholars argue that the countries which have 
compulsory military service system are more prone for a strong militarist discourse. 
During the military service, ordinary citizens are subjected to intense military 
indoctrination and training. In the case of Turkey, we see that the duration of the 
military service was considerably lengthy. Besides, military service has been 
glorified by the civilians, not only as a legal obligation but as a necessity of 
Turkishness. It is obvious that the military service system is an important input in 
the construction of societal perception of military‟s role. Building on such an 
observation, following argument can be asserted: 
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- Strict and lengthy implementation of compulsory military service might cause an 
appropriate environment for a strong militarist discourse among the society.   
   
3.3. Effect of International Relations on Military’s Role and De/Reconstruction 
of TAF’s Role: Post 2001 Period 
     
Constructivist approach should not neglect that social constructions are not static 
but are subject to further change. Jackson and Nexon (2002) underline a flawed 
understanding in comparative politics, which neglects social constructions‟ 
dynamic structure. They name this understanding unit stability (p. 95). Building on 
the understanding of social constructions are subject to further change, they argue 
that “states, societies, nations, (…) social movements are all examples of social 
constructions in the most banal sense: They cannot exist without being actively 
produced and reproduced by the social activities of human beings (p. 100).” At this 
point, I agree with Jackson and Nexon about the dynamic structure of social 
phenomena.  
I aim to make a comparison of two different processes which I believe that 
they are product of different constructions. In this sense, I believe post 2001 period 
in Turkey is an era in which a different discourse on civil-military relations has 
been constructed. Thus, I intend to develop a theoretical approach to explain this 
change. I use two concepts to analyze this period: Deconstruction and 
Reconstruction. At this point, a brief discussion of these two concepts is useful for 
further analysis. 
I should start with noting that the concept of deconstruction is very general 
term which is used in different fields of study. Hence, I had to limit my search of 
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this concept in political science literature. Diane Elam (1994) uses this concept to 
explain the challenge to prevailing political order. She focuses on the issue of 
masculinity of the institutions in her book. According to her theory, the masculinity 
of the political order is the outcome of the institutions and legal settings (p. 89). 
The masculine discourse is produced by these institutions. At this point, since her 
focus is development of the feminist theory, she argues that a healthy development 
of feminist theory can be achieved following the deconstruction of the current 
structure of politics. This usage of deconstruction can be simply applied to the 
scope of this thesis. I argue that the change in the militarist discourse can only be 
achieved by challenging the institutions and political settings which are in the 
source of militarist discourse‟s production. With this in mind, I conceptualize the 
deconstruction as follows: It is the process in which the legal and structural sources 
of the former discourse are challenged by a new setting. In the light of this 
definition, I argue that deconstruction comes one move ahead of reconstruction. 
Without challenging the legal sources of the militarist discourse, development a 
new and different discourse would not be possible, or it would be dominated by the 
prevailing discourse.  
In civil-military relations context, deconstruction is generally starts with the 
effect of an external factor. There are two reasons of this. First, military world is 
conservative in its nature. Politically active military models struggle to preserve the 
status quo that they constructed. Thus, a radical change in the nature of the 
military‟s relationship with the rest of the actors would face with reluctance of 
military. Second reason is the globalized structure of the current world politics. 
Because of globalization, developments in politics can be followed by very wide 
populations in all around the world. Besides, there is not a strict border between 
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domestic and foreign politics anymore, due to the globalized structure of world 
politics. Thus, stable models of civil-military relations that are adopted by 
significant actors of world politics can constitute example for other countries, 
which experience problems in its civil-military settings. These external factors can 
easily trigger a will to reconstruct the relationship between military and civilians.  
Reconstruction process follows the deconstruction of the former structure of 
civil-military relations. I conceptualize reconstruction as the restructuration of the 
military‟s role in a general context. Thus, reconstruction aims to reshape the 
discourse on military‟s role, as well as changing the former structure of civil-
military relations. Major difference in the conceptualizations of deconstruction and 
reconstruction is about the unit that they intend to change. While deconstruction 
reshapes the legal sources of the discourse, reconstruction develops a new discourse 
in accordance with the new setting brought by deconstruction.  
In post 2001 period, Turkey has been experiencing deconstruction and 
reconstruction process concomitantly. Relations with European Union (EU) 
triggered the deconstruction of civil-military relations in Turkey. Many 
amendments have been adopted with the beginnings of 2000‟s. In this section, I 
examine these structural changes in the context of civil-military relations in Turkey. 
Then, I examine reconstruction of the discourse on military and daily practices of 
civil-military relations in accordance with the structural changes.  
The international factor that facilitated the change in the course of Turkish 
civil-military relations was the Helsinki Summit of European Union in 1999. In this 
summit, Turkey was acknowledged as an official candidate to EU. EU made 
Turkey‟s candidacy official in this summit, because the Prime Minister, Bülent 
Ecevit expressed Turkey‟s determination to enforce the reforms required for 
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harmonization to EU context (Milliyet, 12.12.1999). Following this development, 
several harmonization packages have been adopted to reform Turkish political 
system in accordance with EU context. The coalition government of Democratic 
Left Party, Nationalist Action Party and Mother Land Party enforced National 
Program and one harmonization package until they were all defeated in 2002 
elections. In 2002 elections, Justice and Development Party came to power by 
taking the absolute majority in the Parliament and continued to adopt new 
harmonization packages. At this point, it should be noted that the opposition, 
Republican People‟s Party supported this process. Opposition‟s support in the 
Parliament accelerated this process and Turkey gained an important momentum 
between 2002 and 2004. Although harmonization packages were including reforms 
in many different areas, the course of civil-military relations was also affected by 
these reformations.  
 NSC‟s structure was reformed significantly within the scope of 
harmonization packages. According to Özcan (2008), before the harmonization 
packages that reformed NSC‟s status, it was a “shadow government.” NSC‟s status 
was normalized by this reforms and NSC. What were those structural changes in 
the status of NSC? First of all, NSC composition was changed in a way that civilian 
members get majority. Before this change, the numbers of civilians and soldiers 
were equal to eachother. However, due to the strength of the militarist discourse 
during 1990‟s, the Council was an organ in which military imposed its attitudes to 
civilian members of NSC. With the amendment to Article 118 of the Constitution 
in 2001, vice prime ministers became the members of Council. As a result, number 
of the civilians in the council became eight including the chair, the President, while 
military personnel‟s number remained five. Another important change in NSC‟s 
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structure is about the status of its decisions. National Program which was adopted 
in 2001 amended the Article 118 of the Constitution, and NSC‟s decisions became 
“advisory”. Before this regulation, NSC decisions were to consider with “priority” 
by the Council of Ministers. The change in the status of NSC decisions implies a 
radical change in the legal context of Turkish civil-military relations. As touched 
upon before, NSC was so strong that it was determining the political agenda of 
country (Özcan 2008). Even, decisions taken in the NSC summit in 28 February 
1997 caused to fall of Refah-Yol Government. Thus, undermining the NSC‟s status 
in Turkish political system is an important reform for harmonizing Turkish civil-
military relations with European Union context.  
The amendments adopted in 2003 reduced the duties of Secretariat General 
of NSC. Before this amendment, description of Secretariat‟s task was very broad. 
Borrowing from official webpage of Secretariat General of NSC, before the 
amendment the Secretariat was responsible of “conduction of joint work with the 
Ministries and relevant institutions on the preparation of the decisions of the 
National Security Council and in the implementation of these decisions through the 
acts of the Council of Ministers” and “coordination all defense services that did not 
fall within the responsibility of the Armed Forces and follows the arrangements 
concerned”. With the amendment the duty of the Secretariat was reduced to 
ordinary secretary services, such as correspondence affairs among the members.  
All these changes in the legal structure of NSC can be taken in the scope of 
deconstruction. On the other hand, we can observe a radical change in the 
appointment practices of Secretariat General. Although it was not a legal 
obligation, all of the 44 Secretary General of NSC were retired or active generals 
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until 2004
20 . In 2004, former ambassador to Athens, M. Yiğit Alpdoğan was 
appointed as Secretary General of NSC. Two successors of Alpdoğan, Tahsin 
Burcuoğlu and Serdar Kılıç (current Secretary General) were also retired 
ambassadors. Thus, appointment of civilians as the Secretary General of NSC is a 
new practice for Turkish civil-military context. This can be given as an example of 
reconstruction of a new set of practices in post 2001 period.  
Changes in the legal sources of militarist discourse are not limited to 
reforms in the structure of NSC. Second harmonization package that was adopted in 
2002 amended the Law No. 2803 (ABGS 2007), which regulates the duties and 
status of Gendarmerie. Before the amendment, according to Article 9 of the Law, 
highest ranked Gendarmerie officer in a city could serve on behalf of city governor 
in case of his/her absence. This article was an expression of officers‟ primacy to the 
mayor of city, who is an elected person. With the amendment in 2002, this 
statement was abolished.  
Harmonization packages also limited military personnel‟s membership in 
several civilian administrative councils. The Sixth Harmonization Package that was 
adopted in July 2003, ruled that representative of Secretariat General of NSC can 
no longer be a member of the committee which decides on the appropriateness of 
music, video and cinema pieces for distribution. Before the amendment, 
representative appointed by Secretariat General of NSC was one of three members 
of that committee. A similar regulation made in 2004 within the scope of Eighth 
Harmonization Package. Before the amendment, representative sent by General 
Secretary of NSC was member of Higher Council of Radio and Television 
(RTÜK), Higher Education Council (YÖK), even in the Council of Protecting 
                                                          
20
 List of Secretary Generals served from 1938 to present can be seen at official webpage of 
NSC: http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/genelsekreterler1.html (Last access: 01.07.2011) 
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Children against Harmful Publication. With the amendments, membership of NSC 
representative in these councils and organs was abolished. All these regulations can 
be classified as deconstructive implementations of military‟s role in social and 
political life of Turkey. The reforms prepared a ground to diminish the militarist 
discourse in post 2001 period.  
In Seventh Harmonization Package adopted in August 2003 the jurisdiction 
of military courts over civilians was limited. It amended the Article 11 of Law No. 
353, which ruled that civilians can be trialed in military courts if they committed a 
crime in military zones. With the amendment, trial of civilians in military courts 
was rendered to the permission of Ministry of National Defense. Within the scope 
of the same package, expenditures of TAF were subjected to oversight of Turkish 
Court of Accounts.  
Following the start of negotiations with EU in October 2004, several other 
reforms were adopted. Constitutional amendment package that was presented to 
referendum on 12 September 2010 was including important new regulations which 
affected context of civil-military relations. According to Article 125 of the 
Constitution, decisions taken in Supreme Military Council were not subject to 
judicial control. Article 11 of the amendment package changed this situation and 
recognized the right to sue decisions of the Council for those who were discharged 
from TAF. Secondly, according to temporary article 15 of 1982 Constitution, it was 
not possible to judge the initiators of 1980 coup. Article 24 of the package repealed 
this article, and enabled prosecutors to sue the members of National Security 
Council that was established just after the coup and ruled the country until the 
elections in 1983. Finally, Article 15 of the package amended the Article 145 of the 
Constitution, which regulates the procedures of civilian‟s trial in military courts. 
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With this amendment, it is not possible anymore to judge civilians in military 
courts except war times. Besides, the same article of the package ruled that crimes 
of military personnel against the regime are subject to control of civilian courts.  
Reconstruction of the discourse on military can be observed concomitantly 
with the deconstruction process. Reconstruction process can be examined in three 
domains. First, the self-perception of military is affected by the deconstruction 
process, although this effect was limited. Ünsaldı contends that the structural 
reforms in military‟s position did not play a significant role in diminishing the 
military‟s own definition of its role (2005: 264). Yet, there are scholars who defend 
that military‟s self-perception of its role is in a changing path. According to Satana 
(2008), Turkish Armed Forces is one of the major actors which facilitate the 
consolidation of democracy in Turkey. She contends that the recent move of 
democratization in Turkey which started with 2000‟s is affected by military‟s own 
will to democratize. Aydinli (2009) also states that TAF recognized that it is not 
possible for them to take an active role in politics as they did in 1990‟s. I agree with 
that TAF‟s self-perception of its role in politics is in a changing path. We can 
observe this path in a release of former chief of the general staff, Ġlker BaĢbuğ. 
BaĢbuğ stated that (Milliyet, 23.06.2009) “struggle against terrorism must be on the 
basis of human. Struggle with terrorism is not only military‟s affair. Precautions 
against terrorism should not contradict with the principles of universal law.” This is 
a visible change in the discourse of military on terrorism. Still, the issue of whether 
the military‟s former perception of its role is in a changing path is controversial. 
According to Sarigil (2009), although many important reforms have been adopted 
within the EU harmonization framework, Turkish Armed Forces still enjoys its 
strong role in politics. We have witnessed a visible practice of this ongoing strong 
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position in 2007. Military published an ultimatum-like press release in the webpage 
of the Office of the Chief of the General Staff in the midnight on 27 April 2007. In 
this release, it was stated that;   
“The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on 
arguments over secularism. Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the recent 
situation. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces are a party in 
those arguments, and absolute defender of secularism…It will display its attitude 
and action openly and clearly whenever it is necessary (Sarigil 2009: 711).” 
 
According to Sarigil, this demonstrates that problem of the civilian control of 
military is not completely solved.  
Secondly, reconstruction of a new understanding is observable in societal 
sphere. According to Satana(2008: 372), in this new period “it is possible that the 
public will stop seeing the military as the only available modernizing institution.” 
Ergil (2010) contends that the public showed its support on 12 September 2010 
Referendum to the new regulations diminishing the military‟s tutelary role on 
Turkish political system. We can also observe the changing patterns of thinking in 
the general elections in 2007. The elections were important in terms of following 
the ultimatum-like press release mentioned above. Significant increase in the JDP‟s 
vote from 34% to 47% was commented as the reflection of negative attitude of 
public towards the ultimatum.  
Finally, we can observe reconstruction in political sphere. Today, almost all 
actors of the Turkish politics agree on that military should not have an interest in 
politics. According to Tosun (2010), even Republican People‟s Party reconsiders 
and reshapes its policy towards military‟s role in politics. We can see this change in 
election program of the party. According to Article 2 of the party‟s program for 
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2011 elections, “Military Administrative Courts should be closed.” 21 Furthermore, 
RPP touched upon a very radical point according to its historical attitude towards 
the military, during the 2011 election period. In the report of the Party on a new 
constitution, it was declared that new constitution should include a regulation on 
conscientious rejection.
22
 Thus, it is possible to claim that in current Turkish 
politics, attitude of politicians toward military‟s role is different compared to pre-
2001 period.   
To sum up, a changing discourse and political setting have started to be 
constructed with early 2000‟s in Turkey. Development of such a new discourse is 
the outcome of the deconstruction process which challenged the former legal 
setting of civil-military relations and the reconstruction process following this 
challenge to old order. At this point, presence of a strong relationship with an 
international actor facilitated the construction of a new discourse. Since the EU has 
an institutionalized model of stable civil-military relations, it became a pushing 
force for deconstructing the former course of civil-military relations in Turkey. On 
the other hand, commitment and support of domestic political actors, namely the 
military, the civilians and politicians for the process provided a different discourse 
in post 2001 period from the era between 1980 and 2001. Although, it is not still 
perfectly stabilized, it is possible to contend that relation between civilians and 
military in Turkey is in a changing path, which gets closer to Western models of 
civil-military settings.   
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 Full text of the election program can be found at: http://www.chp.org.tr/wp-
content/uploads/41vaat1.pdf (Official Weppage of the Party) (Last access: 12.07.2011) 
22
 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/17917723.asp (Last Access: 12.07.2011) 
 115 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This thesis finds support for the proposition that patterns of civil-military relations 
have been gradually changing in Turkey. The period between 1980 and 2001 has 
been built on the paradigm that was introduced with the 1980 coup. Actually, the 
paradigm of this period was not new for Turkish politics. Looking at the past 
experiences, it is obvious that the army has started to politicize with the change of 
the government‟s control in 1950 as a result of transition to multi-party system. In 
1960, this politicization showed itself as a military coup. However, this intervention 
was not the last one in Turkish politics. After this coup, the instability in the Turkish 
politics sharpened the military‟s reflex to guard the regime. After the 1960 coup, 
Turkish politics experienced direct interventions of military almost in every decade. 
Thus, 1980 coup was not a surprising development for Turkish politics, which was 
struggling with left-right violent conflict in the streets and the deadlock of 
presidential elections. The junta that ruled country from 1980 to 1983 designed a 
new political system in accordance with the opinions of the junta. In this regard, 
1982 Constitution attributed a considerable power to the National Security Council 
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(MGK), which was designed as a military dominant organ. The Council was not 
designed only as an advisory organ. Rather, it was capable enough to shape the 
national security policy of the country and determine the security threats. Besides, 
the military‟s position in the political system has been reinforced further with the 
effect of other laws such as Internal Service Law of Turkish Armed Forces. As a 
result, it is possible to observe a strong military presence within Turkish politics 
during this era. However, students of Turkish politics argue that the military‟s 
influence on Turkish politics has been decreasing since the early 2000‟s. This thesis 
intended to analyze this change in the Turkish military‟s role in specific, and focus 
on how the role of military is constructed in general.  
 In this regard, the field of civil-military relations analyzed the roles of 
different military models. In the literature, the western practices of civil-military 
relations have been idealized as the intended model of the relationship. Thus, many 
authors (Feaver 1992; Schiff 1995; Bland 1999) underlined that the field has 
developed as bound to western models, and theoretical frameworks remained limited 
to explain different paradigms of civil-military relations. This approach is narrow 
and conservative in its nature and context. Once the focus is military‟s role, it should 
not be neglected that an interventionist military model is just one type of military 
role. A military may internalize an interventionist position as well as it may be fully 
subordinated to civilian authority. Then, the question is how this differentiation in 
the roles of militaries emerges. The answer of this thesis is the concept of “role 
construction process.” According to this, any type of military role is not inherited, or 
exogenously given but it emerges as an outcome of this process. Role construction 
process is where social actors interact and contribute to the outcome. In this context, 
I examined constructivist approaches to role construction process. Two general 
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assumptions come forward in the constructivist literature. Firstly, according to 
constructivist scholars, social concepts that we intend to analyze in social research 
are constructed through a process. The process is built on an interactive base. Social 
actors interact within this process and it puts an outcome. Thus, constructivist 
approach justifies why we should analyze the process to discover constructional roots 
of social concepts such as “role of military.” Secondly, constructivist scholars argue 
that roles and preferences of social actors are shaped by their constructed identity. 
Thus, the construction process in which actor‟s identity is constructed should be 
examined to analyze this actor‟s role.  
 Three points can be inferred depending on this approach to role construction. 
First of all, any military role –interventionist/non-interventionist- is not exogenously 
given to military, which is a social actor. Secondly, role of a social actor is not static 
or constant; rather it is continuously changing. Finally, since the process is 
interactive, this role is constructed in different domains. Based on these points, I 
analyzed military‟s role construction process in organizational and societal domains. 
While the organizational domain refers to military‟s legal status within Turkish 
politics and its self-perception of its role, societal domain is composed of two 
spheres: Political sphere and citizenry. 
 It can be inferred that Turkish military enjoyed a significant monopoly in the 
construction process at organizational domain. The legal status of the military was 
considerably strong in the era between 1980 and 2001. Since this period followed a 
military coup, the legal ground for strong military presence within politics were 
prepared within the legal documents. 1982 Constitution was one of the primary 
sources of the military‟s legal status. By the constitution, decisions of Supreme 
Military Council were left outside of judicial review. Besides, National Security 
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Council was designed as a military dominant organ. It was authorized to set up 
national security agenda of the country. Since the Council was dominated by military 
personnel, it turned into an organ in which military dictated its security concepts to 
civilian government, especially during the presidency of Kenan Evren. In addition to 
its legal status, military‟s self-perception of its role is another input of the role 
construction process at organizational domain. Military‟s self-perception of its role is 
built on its active engagement with state/nation-building and modernization 
processes in Turkish political history. Turkish Armed Forces has identified its 
position in Turkish politics with this historical figure. It correlated itself with the 
existence of the nation and state. Thus, it developed a reflex to preserve the secular 
republican regime. Military reinforced its organizational identity by enjoying a high 
degree of autonomy in the designation of its internal education. It reinforced the 
cohesion among its personnel by using the instrument of education. Also, its 
economic enterprise, Armed Forces Pension Fund (OYAK) provided a huge 
economic resource to active and retired military personnel.  
 Role construction of military in societal domain is the second phase. As 
underlined by Rebecca Schiff (1995), former civil-military relations theory literature 
takes the political institutions as the main component of civilian segment. However, 
this thesis agrees with Schiff that civilian segment should be analyzed separately in 
political sphere and citizenry. Thus, it analyzes the role construction in societal 
domain separately in political sphere and citizenry. It is obvious that political sphere 
in Turkey has been influenced by a strong militarist discourse in the period between 
1980 and 2001. Strength of Turkish nationalism offered an important mechanism for 
the expression of militarist discourse. As Bora and Altınay (2001) showed, Turkish 
nationalist ideology includes strong militarist elements. Since nationalist ideology is 
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dispersed into a broad political spectrum in Turkey, militarist discourse found itself a 
vital place in different political movements in Turkey. In addition to nationalist 
ideology, security threats that Turkey faced during 1990‟s constructed a political 
environment in which military‟s guardianship role is justified both among political 
elites and citizenry. The separatist terrorism led by PKK, severe violence of it that 
targeted civilians, civil servants and security forces especially in the southeast region 
of the country reinforced the societal perception on necessity of a strong military. 
Besides, strengthening of political Islam (Welfare Party), and its success in 1995 
elections, alerted secular segments of society. Once again, military was seen as the 
guarantee of the secular regime.  
 Three important civilian mechanisms provided important tools to military to 
disperse its discourse among citizenry. Firstly, the compulsory military service 
provided a huge and unlimited human source to military to express and disperse its 
principles. At least half of the society has been subjected to intense military 
indoctrination. Besides, meaning of the military service in Turkey has gone beyond a 
simple legal obligation; rather it has been an element of a social pressure to exercise 
ordinary experiences of social life such as finding employment or marriage. Besides, 
military service has been an integral part within the masculine identity. Secondly, 
civilian education has influenced by a strong militarist discourse in Turkey. Altınay‟s 
study (2004) on secondary and high school textbooks depicts that several courses, 
such as “History” and “National Security” course are influenced by militarist 
elements. Especially in the National Security Courses, which are in the secondary 
and high school curricula, students are taught how Turkey faces significant internal 
and external threats and Turkish Armed Forces‟ importance in the struggle with these 
security threats. Finally, media has been another social input in the construction of 
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military‟s role in societal domain. Especially in the aftermath of the 1980 coup, the 
mainstream media‟s attitude toward the operation was highly supportive. Most of the 
columnists stated that military‟s intervention has been useful to obviate the chaotic 
political environment and left-right violence in the streets.     
In the post 2001 period, we see the signs of a new set of construction of 
civil-military relations. Most important reason of this change was an external 
factor: the momentum of the relationship between Turkey and EU with early 
2000‟s. Harmonization packages and other reforms in the legal status of the Turkish 
civil-military relations challenged and deconstructed the strong role of military in 
politics. With this aspect, limited but notable change in this period was encouraged 
by an external actor, European Union. EU became a pushing force for reformations 
and encouraged the domestic actors to reconfigure their perception of the Turkish 
civil-military relations in the context of democratization. Following these structural 
changes in the core of the relationship, a new discourse on military‟s role in politics 
started to be reconstructed. In this reconstruction process, actors of Turkish politics 
supported this change in the civil-military relations to some extent.  
Very recent development in Turkish politics, that became a very hot issue in 
Turkish political agenda when this thesis was about to finish, can be showed as an 
example of the changing pattern of civil-military relations in Turkey. On 29 July 
2011, the Command Echelon of the Turkish Armed Forces presented their 
resignation to the Prime Minister just two days before the August summit of 
Supreme Military Council. The Council meets two times in a year. The promotions 
of the officers are determined in the August summits of the Council. August 2011 
summit was important in the sense that the decision about promotions of the 
military personnel who are currently judged in Ergenekon and Balyoz Trials. On 
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July 29, the Chief of the General Staff have met with the Prime Minister. After 
learning from Prime Minister that these personnel will not be promoted in the 
August summit, the Chief of the General Staff, the Commander of the Land Forces, 
the Commander of the Navy and the Commander of the Air Forces demanded their 
retirement. This development is important in terms of showing that in this new era, 
once the dissensus appeared between the military and civilian authority, it did not 
turned into a crisis in civil-military relations. Rather, the military elites remained 
within the boundaries of democratic process.  
In the final word, opportunities for further research should be briefly 
mentioned. First of all, since this thesis intends to build a constructivist theoretical 
framework that can be used in the analysis of civil-military relations, I believe 
further research can be conducted on this dimension. The weakness of the 
theoretical emphasis in the literature has been mentioned by several CMR scholars. 
Besides, Forster (2002) underlined that constructivist approach may provide 
insights to the concepts such as “civilian control”, “professionalization.” At this 
point, I would like to note that this study is not claiming that it is capable enough to 
become a general CMR theory. Rather, it intends to explain the case of Turkey and 
make several theoretical implications for similarly constructed cases. Thus, more 
general studies that utilize constructivist theoretical framework can be conducted to 
seek ground for building a theoretical framework that is capable enough to explain 
general civil-military relations.  
The empirical data show that compulsory military service system in Turkey 
provides an appropriate environment for the construction of a stronger military role. 
It is possible to see similar arguments in the literature, stating that countries that 
apply compulsory conscription system are more prone to have a politically active 
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military. However, concrete data on this correlation is limited. Thus, collection of 
data that shows the correlation between military service system and civil-military 
relations would make an important contribution to the literature. Such a research can 
offer an insight to questions such as “is there a correlation between duration of the 
military service and strong military presence within politics?”  
Finally, self-perception of military and citizenry‟s perception has been the 
focus. More specific research can be conducted to discover the differentiation of the 
perceptions among different divisions of these segments. For example, is it possible 
to take military as a monolithic structure? Are there any divisions within military 
about military‟s role in the system? How different perceptions do these divisions 
have? Similarly, how do different divisions of society perceive military‟s role? For 
example, how do minorities consider military‟s role? What differences can be 
observed in minorities‟ perception of military‟s role from the rest of the society‟s 
perception? These questions can provide opportunities to conduct fruitful research 
to contribute to the CMR literature.   
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